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Reviewed by Dan Hunterf
A recent trend in so-called "second generation" legal commentary
about the Internet suggests that, though it is an unparalleled communica-
tion medium and a means of engaging in global e-commerce, it is not an
unmitigated force for good. Instead, the Net poses a fundamental danger to
democracy. This trend takes shape in works by well-known cyberlaw theo-
rists like Lawrence Lessig, Andrew Shapiro, and Neil Weinstock Netanel,
but the most recent and most troubling criticism lies in Professor Cass
Sunstein 's Republic.com.
In this book, Professor Sunstein argues that perfect filtering of infor-
mation on the Internet will lead to a fractured communications environ-
ment. He suggests that this fracturing will lead to group polarization,
cascades of false information, and a concomitant rise in extremism.
Governmental regulation of the Internet to reduce these features is there-
fore warranted, and desirable. He suggests that the appropriate regulatory
responses should include setting up or supporting public environments for
deliberation and debate on the Net, along with a series of disclosure and
"must-carry" rules.
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This Review finds fault with almost every major feature of Sunstein 's
argument. First, it dismisses his assumptions that perfect filtering on the
Net is either likely to occur, is possible in the sense that he suggests, or is
significantly different from the media filtering that we already experience.
Second, it argues that Sunstein misapplies the social psychology literature
on group polarization toward more extreme positions. Contrary to the fun-
damental basis of Republic.com, the research on group polarization does
not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Internet creates extremist
communications or behavior. Third, it suggests that Sunstein's theory of
governance is controversial, and that important features of cyberliber-
tarian and historicist governance theories seriously undermine his posi-
tion. And finally, this Review criticizes Sunstein 's proposals for reform as
utterly meritless. These proposals are either contradicted by his own ear-
lier perfect filtering argument, or by his misunderstanding of the Net as a
local broadcast medium.
INTRODUCTION
Philippic: (noun), a discourse or declamation full of bitter
condemnation, a tirade.1
Demosthenes was a pre-eminent Athenian statesman who rose to
prominence as the greatest of the Ancient Greek orators.2 A staunch advo-
cate for democratic rule, he was once the leader of the democratic faction
of the Athenian polity. He fought against antidemocratic tendencies, most
notably opposing those who sought to rule Athens as an oligarchy.3
Aside from his central role in the development of democratic thinking,
he was renowned for his orations urging strong responses to the military
threats to the Athenian city state.4 Demosthenes roused the conciliatory
Athenians to oppose the mighty Philip II of Macedon, who had invaded
Greece, captured land and cities, and threatened Athens.' Demosthenes's
four great speeches against Philip came to be known as the "Philippics,"6
1. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 861 (1977), available at Merriam-Webster
Collegiate Dictionary, online edition, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?philippic (last visited
Aug. 29,2001).
2. 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 10, 14 (The Encyclopedia Britannica Company ed., 1910); see
also Encyclopedia Britannica, online edition, at http://www.britannica.com/eb/
article?eu-=30398&tocid=1783 (last visited Aug. 29, 2001). Demosthenes lived from 384 to 322 B.C.
Id.
3. Encyclopedia Britannica, online edition, at http://www.britannica.comleb/
article?eu=30398&tocid=1783 (last visited Aug. 29, 2001).
4. Id.
5. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 2, at 10, 12-13.
6. See DEMOSTHENES, DEMOSTHENES WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION (J.H. Vince trans.)
(1930); First Philippic, available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Dem.+4+1 (last
visited Aug. 29, 2001); Second Philippic, available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/
ptext?lookup=Dem.+6+1 (last visited Aug. 29, 2001); Third Philippic, available at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Dem.+9+1 (last visited Aug. 29, 2001); Fourth
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and remain famous examples of rhetorical art in the service of the public
interest.7 And so it is that tirades against oppressors are now commonly
called "philippics."8
Professor Cass Sunstein is our present-day Demosthenes. Not only is
he, like Demosthenes, a noted democracy theorist,9 but his latest book,
Republic.com, is an extended and impassioned philippic, a tirade against an
oppressor. In Professor Sunstein's philippic, Philip's role is played by the
Internet, or more accurately, by the antidemocratic possibilities of what the
Internet might become. Professor Sunstein identifies the "perfect filtering"
of the Internet as deeply troubling for the democratic process. Filtering in
this context is not confined to censorware, like NetNanny and CyberPatrol,
which blocks access to pornographic and other objectionable material, and
which is the subject of much analysis on the U.S. regulatory response to
Internet content concerns.' Instead, Professor Sunstein discusses perfect
Philippic, available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Dem.+10+l (last visited
Aug. 29, 2001).
7. Three hundred years later, when Marcus Tullius Cicero railed against Marcus Antonius for
seizing power in Rome his jeremiads were known as his Philippics. See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE
ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 194 (C.D. Yonge trans.) (George Bell & Sons ed., 1903),
available at http://wwwv.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=cic.+phil.+l+l; see also The Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Cicero, at http:llwww.utm.edulresearchlieplc/Cicero.htm (last visited Aug.
29,2001).
8. WEBSTER'S, supra note 1, at 861; see also Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, online
edition, supra note 1. ("Etymology: Middle French philippique, from Latin & Greek; Latin philippica,
orationesphilippicae, speeches of Cicero against Mark Antony, translation of Greek philippikoi logoi,
speeches of Demosthenes against Philip II of Macedon, literally, speeches relating to Philip .... ).
9. To cite all his publications would double the length of this Review. For a meaningful subset
of his works in the last few years that deal with issues related to law and democratic theory, see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); STEPHEN
G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, & CASES (4th
ed. 1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN & STEPHEN HOLMES, THE COST OF RIGHTS (1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE (1997); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990); THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE
MODERN STATE (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? hy
Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE LJ. 71 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble]; Cass
R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Television]; Cass R. Sunstein, The Privatization of Our Public Discourse, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. &
LIT. 129 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Public Discourse]; Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999) [hereinafter Kuran &
Sunstein, Cascades]; David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100
COLrM. L. REv. 1139 (2000) [hereinafter Schkade et al., Dollars]; Cass IL Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Informational Standing, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613 (1999).
10. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REv. 755 (1999);
Whitney A. Kaiser, The Use of Internet Filters in Public Schools: Double Click on the Constitution, 34
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROas. 49 (2000); Jennifer Zwick, Comment, Casting a Net over the
Net: Attempts to Protect Children in Cyberspace, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1133 (2000); Mark S.
Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and School
Libraries: What Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1117 (2000); Christopher T.
Furlow, Erogenous Zoning on the Cyber-Frontier, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2000); Junichi P. Semitsu,
HeinOnline  -- 90 Cal. L. Rev. 613 2002
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filtering, a hypothetical technology enabling a person to receive only the
media content that she or he desires, by filtering out all other material.
Professor Sunstein argues that once we have perfect filtering in place,
we will see a rise in group polarization and a concomitant rise in extremist
thought, dialog, and action. He supports this argument with studies from
social psychology that show how groups reinforce prejudices and lead to
more extreme conclusions than the average of that group held prior to the
group interaction. From these studies, he concludes that perfect filtering
and the Internet pose a danger to liberal democracy that the state must
address. He posits a number of suggestions as to how the state should solve
this problem.
I contest virtually every aspect of his analysis. Perfect filtering is
technologically implausible, and so difficult as to be, essentially, science
fiction. Even if the technology were feasible, however, its effect would
differ little from the media filtering that we currently have, and that has not
led to a terrifying rise in extremism. Further, assuming perfect filtering
were to exist as Professor Sunstein posits, the social psychology research
simply does not support the extreme conclusion he reaches. And finally, in
the unlikely event that he is correct in his first two premises, a slew of
problems undermine Professor Sunstein's regulatory reform proposals,
rendering them utterly ineffective.
Few commentators have recognized these flaws. Republic.com is
already an influential philippic, which respected academics take seri-
ously." Commentators have referred to it as "insightful and far-reaching,"'"
"eminently sensible, ' .3 "timely" and "sophisticated,"' 4 a "thoughtful book
[that] deliberately raises more questions than it answers,"' 5 and "[a]
gripping, provocative argument. . that the dot.com hurrah chorus will
ignore at its (and our) peril." 6 Republic.com appears as the highpoint in a
recent movement that paints a very bleak picture of the antidemocratic
nature of the Internet. We see similar concerns in works by Lawrence
Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filtering Software vs. the First Amendment, 52
STAN. L. REv. 509 (2000).
11. See Elizabeth Garrett, Political Intermediaries and the Internet "Revolution, " 34 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1055, 1063 (2001) (adopting Sunstein's thesis that cyberspace leads to a decline in the richness
of political discourse); see also Thomas E. Baker, A Roundtable Discussion with Lawrence Lessig,
David G. Post & Jeffrey Rosen, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 448 (2001) (comments of Jeffrey Rosen
adopting Sunstein's account of group polarization and "worrying" about the consequences).
12. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, book jacket of REPUBLIC.COM.
13. Merle Rubin, Create Your Own World on the Internet-and Democracy Crumbles,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 15, 200 1, at 16.
14. Peter Aspden, FINANCIAL TIMEs, quoted in Princeton University Press,
http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7014.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
15. Recent Publications, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1827, 1832 (2001).
16. Stephen Holmes, book jacket of REPUBLIC.COM.
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Lessig,17 Andrew Shapiro,s Neil Weinstock Netanel,19 and others. °
Though most of these works are more nuanced, and less relentlessly pessi-
mistic, than Republic.com, they collectively argue that the Internet leads to
social dilemmas and a loss of control over public policy. According to this
17. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (arguing
that software code is the most important Net regulatory mechanism and that policy analysis reflect this)
[hereinafter LESsIG, CODE]; Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach,
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 505-06 (1999) (arguing, against Judge Easterbrook, that cyberspace regulation
teaches us about law generally); Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 Cuba. L. REv. 1 (1996-
97) [hereinafter Lessig, Constitution] (examining how constraints regulate cyberspace and the
constitutional implications); Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and
the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759 (1999) (arguing in favor of open code and its effect
on government regulation); Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 629 (1998) (examining speech regulation online, comparing filters to governmental
regulation); Lawrence Lessig, Commons and Code, 9 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 405
(1999) (decrying the propertization of cyberspace and the online tragedy of the commons); Lawrence
Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMZENT. 635 (1996) [hereinafter
Lessig, Intellectual Property] (warning against zoning online and its effect on intellectual property);
Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996) [hereinafter
Lessig, Reading] (examining the dangers of reading the Constitution in cyberspace); Lawrence Lessig,
The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Zones] (describing zoning
online and the potential pernicious effect).
18. See generally ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS
PUrTTNG PEOPLE IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNoW (1999) (demonstrating that the
Net generates issues in control, personalization, and so forth) (hereinafter SHAPIRO, CONTROL
REVOLUTION); Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 SETON
HALL CONsT. L.J. 703 (1998) [hereinafter Shapiro, Disappearance) (arguing that cyberspace should
not be regulated separately from the real world).
19. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEx. L. REv. 447, 457, 469-90
(2000) (hook review) [Hereinafter "Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0"] (reviewing LESSIG, CODE supra note 17,
and SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18, and adopting inter alia the view that individual
control on the Internet leads to societal fragmentation, retarded personal development, and a balkanized
public discourse); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View
from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395 (2000) (attacking the cyberlibertarian model
of Internet democratic involvement) [hereinafter Netanel, Self-Governance]; Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1902-03
(2000) (discussing the possibility of digital rights management and the control of content providers
over each use of their material).
20. See generally Philip E. Agre, Life After Cyberspace, 18 EUR. Ass'N FOR THE STUDY OF SCI.
& TECH. REV. (Sept. 1999), at http://www.chem.uva.nl/easst/easst993.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2001)
(describing the concentration of power on the Internet and arguing against the nalve conception of the
Internet's decentralized control structures); William W. Fisher IlI, Property and Contract on the
Internet, 73 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998) (describing how contract is decentering copyright as the
means of controlling digital works, and the danger this has for the public policy balance); Mark A.
Lemley, The Law and Economics ofInternet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1257 (1998) (showing the
effect of norms in the private ordering of online mechanisms); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner,
The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 Cl.-KENT L. REv.
1295 (1998) (demonstrating the connection between the public and private spheres in cyberspace
regulation); Edward L. Rubin, Computer Languages as Networks and Power Structures: Governing
the Development of XML, 53 S.M.U. L. REv. 1447 (2000) (arguing that computer standards and
languages involve the exercise of legal and regulatory power structures); Timothy Wu, Application-
Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REv. 1163 (1999) (arguing for a different classification of the
Internet and demonstrating how this leads to different regulatory responses).
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stream of scholarship, we are fast approaching the point where the accepted
wisdom dictates that cyberspace is a nightmarish place.
Professor Sunstein has labeled these new works the "second
generation" of scholarship about the Internet.2 If it is a generation, then it
is a generation that is becoming entrenched and is becoming more power-
ful. In a book review entitled Code Comfort, Professor Sunstein adum-
brates much of the argument in Republic.com, and explains how the first
generation of works was so wrong:
No longer breathless over the possibilities, these [second-
generation] writers are sharply critical of cyberspace's libertarian
orthodoxy. The importance of their arguments lies in their shared
concern about the lack of public discussion of the emerging
problems, and the possible adverse effects not only of public power
but also of private power over both consumption and citizenship-
and particularly over the possible adverse effects of private
manipulation, which is often invisible to consumers.2
This Review takes issue with the collective subtext of some of these
second-generation works, and the specific thesis of Sunstein's book.23 He
argues that the Internet inevitably generates social fragmentation and dislo-
cation, which is inimical to democracy (pp. 51-88). Against this, I contend
that the Internet is the greatest communications medium we have ever seen.
Its benefits are great, and its risks to democracy slight. I do not believe the
philippic. Instead, I play the role of.Eschines, Demosthenes's adversary in
21. Cass R. Sunstein, Code Comfort, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Jan. 10, 2000, available at
http://www.thenewrepublic.com/magazines/ttnr/011000/sunsteinOI1000.html (last visited Aug. 29,
2001) (characterizing this work as the second generation) [hereinafter Sunstein, Code Comfort]; see
also Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, supra note 19, at 451; SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18,
at 280; Technorealism website, at http://www.technorealism.org/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2001).
22. Sunstein, Code Comfort, supra note 21.
23. It does not, however, take issue with other "second-generation" concerns, such as the
increasing private control over copyright material. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981
(1996) [hereinafter Cohen, Right]; Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Privacy and Censorship of the Internet,
8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 693 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Intellectual Privacy]; Tom W. Bell, Fair
Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine,
76 N.C. L. REv. 557 (1998) [hereinafter Bell, Fair Use]; Jonathan Weinberg, Hardivare-Based ID,
Rights Management, and Trusted Systems, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1251 (2000). It also does not contest
second-generation arguments regarding the diminution of online free speech. See Lsslo, CODE, supra
note 17, at 164-85; Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers
of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003 (2000); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking
About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000). It also makes no opposition to second-generation scholars'
claims regarding the private control of personal information and the absence of data privacy. See A.
Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000) [hereinafter Froomkin,
Death of Privacy]; Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1283
(2000); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000); Nadine
Strossen, Protecting Privacy and Free Speech in Cyberspace, 89 GEO. L.J. 2103 (2001).
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the Athenian senate.24 Eschines evidently did not have Demosthenes's
oratorical skills," and no word was ever coined in his honor. Nevertheless,
he provided the Athenians with a counterpoint to Demosthenes's philip-
pics, and Eschines's orations tempered the excesses of Demosthenes's
rhetoric. To play the role of Eschines, I first examine the philippic at issue
and explore the reasons why Sunstein launches himself on an extended
"philippic.com" against the Internet.
I
REPUBLIC.COM
If the question before us were a new one, men of Athens, I should
have waited until most of the regular speakers had delivered their
opinions, and if satisfied with any of their proposals, I should have
remained silent, but if not satisfied, I should then have tried to
express my own views. Since, however, it is our fortune to be still
debating a point on which they have often spoken before, I can
safely claim your indulgence if I am the first to rise and address
you. For if in the past their advice had been sound, there would be
no need for deliberation today.
Demosthenes, First Philippi 6
Professor Sunstein is not the first to rise and address us on the
Internet's potential threat to democracy, nor is he the first to agonize over
difficulties that the Internet poses to regulatory theory. Professor Lessig's
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace27 probably marked the first point at
which this thesis entered popular culture, though it had been a theme for
some time prior to this.28 Nonetheless, Republic.com stands as the first
concerted effort to argue that democracy is under threat from filtering
technologies of the Net, that social fracturing is consequently likely, and
that the state should intervene to regulate this undesirable outcome.2 9
Republic.com therefore marks quite a departure from earlier accounts of
24. Encyclopedia Britannica, supra note 3.
25. Though he was a well-known Athenian orator, see Fschines, Encyclopedia.com, at
http:/vww.encyclopedia.con/articles!00150.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2002); see also Eschines,
Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/ae/Aeschine.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2002).
26. DEMOSTHENES, First Philippic, supra note 6, para. 1.
27. LEssIG, CODE, supra note 17.
28. See, e.g., Cohen, Right, supra note 23, at 994-1020; Cohen, Intellectual Privacy, supra note
23; Bell, Fair Use, supra note 23; Lessig, Constitution, supra note 17, at 8-12; Lessig, Intellectual
Property, supra note 17, at 637-39; Lessig, Reading, supra note 17, at 895-907; Lessig, Zones, supra
note 17; Shapiro, Disappearance, supra note 18, at 715-23.
29. Much of Sunstein's argument is drawn from Shapiro. See SHAPJRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION,
supra note 18, at 105-23. However, unlike Republic.con, Shapiro's work is not a jeremiad against the
Internet; it is a quite balanced account of the benefits and potential detriments of the Net. See, e.g., id.
at 5-104.
2002]
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cyberlaw and democracy, which, though sometimes strident about the
problems we face, were not so relentlessly pessimistic about the Net.
A. Perfect Filtering's Threat to Democracy
Republic.com begins with a short sketch of a future where technology
has provided us with the ability to filter what we want to see, read, and
hear (pp. 3-5). Sunstein argues that we will soon have perfect filtering, so
that we will see, read, or hear only that we which we desire. We will go
through our lives cosseted in a warm technological blanket that will rein-
force those voices that agree with us, and will shut out any opposing view-
points (pp. 71-75).3°
This prospect troubles Sunstein deeply. While he recognizes that fil-
tering can provide some wonderful benefits (p. 26),31 in general Sunstein
sees the effects of perfect filtering as pernicious and inimical to democratic
ideals. For a start, it eliminates the public forum, the space where we
encounter others exchanging ideas (pp. 30-33). Since the Supreme Court
ruling in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,32 Americans
have been guaranteed the public forum of the streets and parks, to express
unpopular views, to rail against the government, to complain about their
taxes, and so forth.33 This right to express views contrary to the mainstream
is not confined to the United States; it is a cornerstone of democratic gov-
ernance worldwide.34 Deliberative democracy within these systems relies
in part on a citizenry exposed to many viewpoints, and a polity which is
characterized by reflection and debate (p. 38).3 Perfect filtering courtesy of
the Internet, argues Sunstein, challenges this hitherto-assumed feature of
our democratic system (p. 50).
To support this argument, Sunstein begins with an examination of the
proliferation of special-interest websites. It is obvious, of course, that mil-
lions of sites are tailored to particular interests, some facially unobjection-
able and some problematic. The websites titanicmovie.com and
30. The technical basis for these filtering technologies is set out in infra Part II.A.
31. For example, Amazon uses filtering technology to recommend new books based on what you
have previously bought, and sometimes these recommendations are "miraculously good, even
uncanny" (p. 26).
32. 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (holding that the privilege of using streets and parks for the
exchange of views may be regulated in the interest of all, but cannot be abridged under guise of
regulation).
33. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1999).
34. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 34-50, 203
(1997).
35. Deliberative democracy is a component of Pettit's conception of republicanism. See id at 34-
50, 203. This can be seen in part as a response to an alternate democratic theory: that of direct
democracy. A number of theories of Internet governance stress the benefits of some features of Internet
direct democracy. See infra note 60. Others, most notably Neil Weinstock Netanel, suggest that this has
significant theoretical problems. See Netanel, Self-Governance, supra note 19, at 410-51 (arguing
against cyberspace self-governance from the position of democratic theory).
[Vol. 90:611
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Eonline.com (p. 58) are narrow, but largely untroubling; the hate sites of
the Ku Klux Klan, God Hates Fags, or All Men Must Die (pp. 62-65) are
narrowly focused, and deeply worrying. One would think that, aside from
the special case of hate sites, proliferation of special interest groups online
would be a (perhaps qualified) good. It is not obvious that there is a prob-
lem with, say, Jurist, "The Law Professors' Site,"36 or the Social Science
Research Network,37 where Cass Sunstein can obtain focused material that
is relevant to his professional work as a legal academic. And even he notes
the benefits of specialist sites on Rhodesian Ridgebacks where he was able
to find his new puppy.38 Sites that deliver content that is very relevant to a
particular need are one of the more useful features of the web, often char-
acterized as having a high signal-to-noise ratio.
Sunstein gives short shrift to the uncontroverted fact that the Net and
the web allow those who previously had no voice to share common experi-
ences, form communities, and air their frustrations (pp. 75-79). This
"virtual world" discourse has significant importance in the physical world.
The unprecedented confession and apology of Zhu Rongzhi, the Chinese
Prime Minister, over an explosion that killed forty-two people, including
thirty-eight children, is an excellent recent example.39 The explosion was in
a school where children were being forced to make fireworks. The official
government news reported that the explosion was caused by a mad
bomber.4" However, participants in Internet chatrooms subsequently made
clear the real reason.4' Outrage spread in the real world of mainland China,
and the Prime Minister apologized, though he did not refute the official
story.42 There are many other examples of the benefits of online discourse,
from autistic children being able to communicate freely for the first time,43
to Burmese and East Timorese activists being able to fight repressive mili-
tary regimes. 44
Though Republic.com recognizes that online fora may provide impor-
tant outlets for self-expression for those who might otherwise be invisible
or silenced (pp. 75-77), Sunstein outlines a terrifying danger. Special inter-
est sites fracture the community into small pockets of special interest,
36. http://jurist.law.pitt.edu (last visited Aug. 29, 2001).
37. http://wwv.ssm.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2001). See Sunstein, Code Comfort, supra note
21.
38. See Sunstein, Code Comfort, supra note 21, at 37.
39. Joe Klein, Comment, China.org, THE NEw YORKER, Apr. 23 & 30,2001, at 53.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 54.
43. Henry Blume, On the Net, NEw YORK TWiEs, June 30, 1997, D6, cited in SHAPIRO, CONTROL
REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 49.
44. SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 50-51. There exist numerous other
examples of socially desirable and prodemocratic features of the Internet. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen,
Democracy and the Internet, 2 J. L. TECH. & POL'Y 24-29 (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=-286293.
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dividing along race, gender, political, or other lines. He notes that special-
ized sites for the African-American community (for example, afritech.com,
Tony Brown online, melanet.com) will probably not attract Caucasian
voices (pp. 57-58). Of the top sites for women over fifty, only hotmail.com
is shared by men over fifty (p. 58). And while girls aged twelve to seven-
teen visit pathfinder.com or Eonline.com, boys of the same age visit
ESPN.com or playboy.corn (p. 58). Most troubling for Sunstein, sites typi-
cally provide no link to opposing viewpoints, and where they do provide
such a link it is used to demonstrate how stupid, contemptible, or danger-
ous the other views are (p. 59-60)."5
At first this seems unremarkable, and we might be tempted to shrug
the observation away. Sunstein suggests that complacency would be a mis-
take for two reasons. The first relies on social psychological studies into
"group polarization" (pp. 56-80), and the second involves behavioral eco-
nomic theories of "information cascades" (pp. 80-84).
B. The Danger of Group Polarization
"Group polarization" is the name given to the effect of group delibera-
tion on people's viewpoints (p. 65). In numerous studies, it has been shown
that after deliberation in a group, people's views generally become more
extreme (p. 65). Sunstein provides examples of this phenomenon. In group
deliberation settings, French students become more critical of the United
States, moderately profeminist women become more critical of men, and
Whites predisposed to racial prejudice express more racist sentiments
(p. 66). The explanations for this effect are twofold. The first involves a
recognition of the importance of persuasive argument. Group polarization
occurs when the group, taken as a whole, has a particular orientation. In
these settings there is likely to be a disproportionately large number of per-
suasive arguments in the direction the group is leaning (pp. 67-68).46 The
second explanation is that people wish to be liked. In a group that clearly
holds a particular view, those who share a more moderate version of that
view will be tempted to adjust their viewpoint in the direction of the group;
and consequently the views they express become more extreme (pp. 67-
68). 4 7
45. One wonders what is the "opposing viewpoint" to which playboy.corn should provide a link.
Perhaps the websites for "All Men Must Die," or Andrea Dworkin's, or Catherine MacKinnon's
websites? What then would be the opposing view of ESPN.com? The website for the National
Endowment for the Arts? But I digress. For a full discussion of the problems with Sunstein's regulatory
responses, see infra Part V.
46. For a review and analysis of the persuasive argument theory of group polarization, see infra
Part III.B.
47. For an examination of the social comparison theory of group polarization, see infra Part
III.A.2.
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Sunstein argues that this group polarization effect has tremendous
importance to our conception of the benefits and detriments of the Internet
as a communications medium (pp. 71-75). As interests are segmented into,
and addressed by, individual websites, a segmented communications
environment will emerge. As perfect filtering becomes a reality, people
will only hear from a small group of like-minded people. Since they
increasingly will talk only to each other, group polarization will occur,
leading to more extreme viewpoints than that which any of the members of
that group initially held. Extremism will feed on extremism in this balkan-
ized environment, driving people further apart, fracturing our society, and
diminishing community identity. In the end, this extremism threatens de-
mocracy and peace (pp. 66-67). According to Sunstein, these dangers are
even more pronounced because of the manner in which the Net facilitates
anonymity and the opportunity to identify with a group.48 Sunstein recog-
nizes that group polarization has some beneficial features: most notable is
what he calls "enclave deliberation" (pp. 75-79), where disadvantaged
groups can engage in what in other contexts has been called
"consciousness-raising."4 9 However, his overwhelming emphasis is upon
the negative features of group polarization."
C. Perilous Information Cascades
"Information cascades" are the second major basis of Sunstein's con-
cerns (pp. 80-84). 51 Social groups move rapidly towards a set of beliefs that
may be unsupported by evidence, in a process that is like a chain reaction
or cascade of disinformation, and which is self-reinforcing.52 This effect is
generated by a number of factors, including the difficulty of becoming
fully apprised of all evidence, the difficulty of assessing this evidence, the
emphasis placed upon recent information due to cognitive processing
48. In settings where the participant was anonymous and the group identity was emphasized, the
group polarization effect was pronounced (p. 71).
49. Drucilla Comell, Just Cause: Freedom, Identity, and Rights 11-15 (2000).
50. Sunstein devotes two and a half pages to the positive benefits that "enclave deliberation"
might bring (pp. 75-77), and the remaining thirty-seven pages of the chapter to the negative impact of
group polarization and cybercascades (pp. 51-74, 77-78).
51. For research within behavioral economics (and consumer psychology) on the cascade effect,
see TtiuluR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALsnRCATION (1995); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity,
Fads, and Informational Cascades, J. ECON. PESP. 151 (1998); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model
of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum,
Stampede to Judgment: Pervasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 Am. L. & ECON. REv.
158 (1999); Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 Am. J. SOCIOLOGY 1420
(1978); Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 Am. ECON.
REv. 847 (1997).
52. Kuran & Sunstein, Cascades, supra note 9, at 685-86 ("An informational cascade occurs
when people with incomplete personal information on a particular matter base their own beliefs on the
apparent beliefs of others.").
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shortcuts such as the "availability heuristic," deference to socially-
dominant influential information arbiters, and concerns about reputation
and social standing in the event of disagreement.53
As examples of the way information cascades function, consider the
task of correctly determining the answer to the following questions. Is
global warming a serious crisis (p. 81)? Is Alar, a pesticide used on apples,
a serious health risk to children consuming apples?54 Are toxic waste
dumps hazardous (p. 81)?"5 Is AIDS being spread in the African-American
community by white doctors (p. 81)? Was the crash of TWA flight 800
caused by navy friendly-fire (p. 82)?56
For each of these questions it is difficult to assess evidence one way
or the other. We tend to be influenced by pundits and those who we
believe are better informed than we are. 7 As a result, incorrect information
can propagate wildly, cascading through the communication network.
Sunstein argues that these "information cascades" are more problematic in
cyberspace than in physical space. "Cybercascades" occur spontaneously
and spread rapidly because of the prevalence and speed of email discussion
lists, news postings, websites, and other Internet protocols (pp. 81-82). In a
well-known example, the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, came to
believe that HIV does not cause AIDS, after he surfed a series of conspir-
acy-theory websites (pp. 82-83).
Sunstein's concern is that cyberspace serves as a "breeding ground"
for information cascades, and that millions of people will, as a result, end
up believing falsehoods and rumors (p. 84). Cybercascades, in conjunction
with group polarization, may lead to political extremism and social frag-
mentation, and imperil the requirements for a democratic polity and society
(p. 84).
D. Consumer Sovereignty and Democracy
With these lessons sharply in mind, Republic.com goes on to explain
the social benefits of shared experience and especially shared information
(pp. 89-103). The thesis here is that shared experiences lead to greater
social cohesion, as well as improved understanding and acceptance of oth-
ers (pp. 95-96). Sunstein defends this conception against the obvious
charge that individual sovereignty and choice are fundamental to liberty,
and indeed, that they are liberty itself. He further claims that any argument
53. For a full account of the factors and their interactions, see id. at 703-40.
54. See id. at 698-70 1.
55. See id. at 691-98.
56. See id. at 702-03.
57. For a more complete articulation of Sunstein's general theory of information cascades in law,
not just in cyberspace, and how they tie to reputational cascades, see Kuran & Sunstein, Cascades,
supra note 9.
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in favor of a communications policy limiting choice is not necessarily an
attack on fundamental freedoms.
He draws a distinction between consumer sovereignty and democracy
(pp. 113-23). He is concerned that citizens of a democracy not confuse a
reduction in consumption choices with a reduction in individual freedoms.
Consumer sovereignty, he argues, is not the same as freedom. While a free
society will generally respect people's choices, consumer choice is not an
absolute and is determined in part by access. 8 Hence, Sunstein argues,
considerations other than maximizing consumption choices should be taken
into account in molding our response to communication infrastructure ac-
cess (pp. 105-23). 9
He contrasts his communitarian view with the specialization and indi-
viduality possible with the Net, and the libertarian political philosophy
shared by many early Internet users.6" Here Republic.com provides a posi-
tive argument in favor of information sharing, rather than the previous
negative arguments against individuality and the Net. Sunstein here seeks
to preempt the likely libertarian concerns with his arguments in favor of
limiting access to information.6
An important aspect of these chapters on consumer sovereignty and
freedom is the role given over to "general interest intermediaries" (pp. 34-
37), that is, to magazines, newspapers, radio, and television broadcasters
58. Especially in broadcast communications, availability determines some preferences-access to
sports channels, say, rather than international news. A deprivation of access to international news might
be considered a deprivation of freedom, even though the majority of people have adapted to a diet
exclusively of local sports and never perceive that they are being deprived of anything (pp. 107-09).
59. In this section of the book, he further argues that consumer sovereignty is leading to
individual unhappiness (pp. 117-22). This aspect of his argument is so strangely disconnected from,
and irrelevant to, the rest of his argument that any discussion of it need not detain us.
60. For examples of the cyberlibertarian argument, see David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law
and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996) [hereinafter Johnson &
Post, Borders] (arguing that cyberspace can and should be regulated as a separate, nongeographical
place); David Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. Rev. 155 (1996); John Perry Barlow, A
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, at http://www.eff.org/pub/Misc/Publicationsl
John PerryBarlow/barlow_0296.declaration (last visited Aug. 31, 2001) (asserting the independence
of cyberspace from real-space sovereigns); David R. Johnson & David Post, The New "Civic Virtue' of
the Internet (1998), at http://wwv.cli.orglpaper4.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2001) (arguing in favor of
allowing the Internet to evolve on its own, based on complexity theory); David G. Post, nhat Larry
Doesn't Get: Code, Lav, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1439, 1448 (2000) [hereinafter
Post, Larry] (reviewing LESSIG, CODE, supra note 17, and arguing against his requirement of real-space
government involvement in cyberspace governance); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation,
Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for
Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475 (1997) (foreshadowing the closing of
the "cyberspace frontier" and demonstrating the concomitant rise in private regulation); I. Trotter
Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PiT-. L. REv. 993 (1994) (arguing that some
cyberspace issues are novel and in need of new approaches to their regulation); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Cyberspace Self Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 413, 419-20 (1997) (arguing in favor of cyberspace self-govemance).
61. He undertakes a similar exercise in chapters six and seven. For a discussion of a
cyberlibertarian view of his position see infra Part IV.
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that reach a large number of people and provide the same information to
all. Sunstein introduces this idea early in the book and suggests that they
are "unacknowledged public fora" (pp. 34-37). They provide the social
glue that Sunstein glorifies in the middle of Republic.com, and that is jux-
taposed with the fragmentation that he believes the Internet will bring.
These general interest intermediaries form part of his response to the prob-
lems he predicts, and his proposals form the third major part of the book
(pp. 167-90). If he is right in his identification of perfect filtering and
group polarization, he argues, then we must promote people's exposure to
topics that they would not have chosen themselves, encourage access to
shared experience, and promote debate about policy and principle (p. 167).
E. Regulatory Proposals
To meet these aims he makes six proposals. First, we should set up
"deliberative domains" on the Net, where issues of public policy can be
shared and debated (pp. 170-72). Second, we should require the producers
of potentially harmful communications to disclose the harm to the public
(pp. 172-77). Third, we must institute a code of conduct that encourages
self-regulation by communications providers (pp. 177-80). Fourth, adopt-
ing a suggestion made by Andrew Shapiro,6' we should provide govern-
ment subsidies to websites that encourage public debate (pp. 180-82).
Fifth, we should have "must-carry" rules for popular websites, so that they
are forced to include links to sites that encourage debate over substantive
questions of public interest (pp. 182-89). And finally, we should mandate
"must-carry" rules for particularly partisan websites, so that they are forced
to include links to sites that have opposing views (pp. 184-89).
Professor Sunstein writes beautifully and forcefully, and he has the
gift of being able to make each point appear to be the next link in a com-
pelling and unassailable chain of arguments. Upon a close analysis, how-
ever, each of these links has terrible cracks. In order to succeed, Professor
Sunstein's philippic must convince us that four main links can withstand
the pressures of his overall thesis. The first link is his assumption that per-
fect filtering is possible and likely, and will operate as described. Second,
he assumes that this perfect filtering will lead to group polarization, cyber-
cascades, or other undesirable social features. Third, he argues that as a
result, governmental regulation of the Internet is warranted and desirable.
And finally, he suggests that his proposals for regulation are appropriate
and might plausibly succeed.
Unfortunately, each one of Sunstein's arguments is deeply flawed. I
first challenge his assumptions that perfect filtering is likely to occur, or
that it is any more troubling than our current media filtering techniques.63
62. SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 205-06,215,227.
63. See infra Part II.
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Second, I argue that, contrary to the fundamental basis of Republic.com,
the research on group polarization does not inevitably lead to the conclu-
sion that the Internet will lead to extremist communications or behavior.' 4
Third, I argue that aspects of cyberlibertarian and democratic historicist
theory that address paternalism, Internet sovereignty, and the nature of de-
mocracy cause problems for Republic.com. Finally, I contend that he does
not seem to recognize the differences between regulating the Internet and
regulating other types of media. Most notable of the problems here is the
risk of regulatory arbitrage that his governance theory fails to recognize.
65
Since his diagnosis is incorrect, his prescriptions for relief are unnecessary
and probably dangerous to the patient. But even if his diagnosis were accu-
rate, I will argue that his proposals turn out to be practically and theoreti-
cally incoherent. Amongst a host of problems, they are all either
contradicted by his own earlier perfect filtering argument, or by the impos-
sibility of regulating the Internet as though it were a local communications
medium.66
II
THE PERFECT FILTERING MYTH
It is some time in the future. Technology has greatly increased
people's ability to "filter" what they want to read, see, and hear.
General interest newspapers and magazines are largely a thing of
the past. The same is true of broadcasters. The idea of choosing
"channel 4" or instead "channel 7" seems positively quaint. With
the aid of a television or computer screen, and the Internet, you are
able to design your own newspapers and magazines. Having
dispensed with broadcasters, you can choose your own video
programming, with movies, game shows, sports, shopping, and
news of your choice. You mix and match.
You need not come across topics and views that you have not
sought out. Without any difficulty, you are able to see exactly what
you want to see, no more and no less (p. 3).
In the mid-1990s, the director of the Media Lab at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Nicholas Negroponte, described a future where
media had converged with information technology, and where multiple
media channels disseminated content in a seamless system of informa-
tion.67 Part of this vision of the near-future involved a highly personalized
newspaper-cum-television-cum-radio-cum-any-media-at-all source, which
he called The Daily Me.6" The Daily Me is supposed to provide highly
64. See infia Part Ill.
65. See infra Part IV.
66. See infra Part V.
67. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 152-54 (1995).
68. Id. at 153.
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individualized content to various viewing or hearing mechanisms, based on
the individual's preferences for both content and dissemination. Thus, in
this utopian future, in the morning The Daily Me wakes me with an audio
ensemble of mellow hits of the "seventies, eighties, and nineties" from
what we would nowadays think of as a clock radio. It then feeds
customized news reports-say a heady combination of international geopo-
litical news and college hoops-to an interactive tablet that takes the place
of my current morning newspaper. During the day, The Daily Me uses my
work computer to keep me informed, providing me with stock quotes and
information about corporate takeovers, as well as, perhaps, some lunchtime
Bach and the latest celebrity news from People magazine to aid my diges-
tion. In the afternoon, as I drive home my in-car The Daily Me takes the
form of audio streams of ambient trip-hop dance music sent direct from
The Ministry of Sound club in London. In the evening it provides endless
reruns of Sports Night and Seinfeld on what I now think of as my televi-
sion. And at night it lulls me to sleep with David Foster Wallace's latest
book-Infinite Jest II, perhaps-presented on a small "paperback" com-
puter. It gives me all the media content I want, when I want it, independent
of the transmission device. And more importantly, at least for Professor
Sunstein, it never gives me anything I do not want.
Negroponte's The Daily Me represents the apogee of personalized
media. It is a vision that stirs the grandest dreams of techno-moguls such as
Bill Gates. 69 But it fuels the nightmares of Cass Sunstein and is the starting
premise of Republic.com (pp. 3-5).7 However, though it is a key assump-
tion, Sunstein spends little time discussing whether, or how, The Daily Me
might actually work. Of the book's 224 pages, only the introductory five
pages talk at all about perfect filtering, and of those five the majority is
spent describing a few basic examples. In fact, at no point does Sunstein
analyze what it would take to build the perfect filtering technology of The
Daily Me.7 He accepts at face value the hype of technology-company
CEOs, whose stock portfolio value is determined in part by gee-whiz prog-
nostications of how cool and efficient the technology is going to be.
69. Bill Gates imagined:
The "TV guide" will almost be like a search portal where you'll customize and say, "I'm
never interested in this, but I am particularly interested in that." It's already getting a little
unwieldy. When you turn on DirecTV and you step through every channel-well, there's
three minutes of your life. When you walk into your living room six years from now, you'll
be able to just say what you're interested in, and have the screen help you pick out a video
that you care about. It's not going to be "Let's look at channels 4, 5, and 7." It's going to be
something that has pretty incredible graphics and it's got an Internet connection to it.
Bill Gates, prelude to REPUBLIC.COM [hereinafter Gates, TV Guide].
70. The concept is also found in other "second-generation" works like Andrew Shapiro's Control
Revolution. SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 105-14. It performs a similar function
in Shapiro's work, though Shapiro recognizes some of the benefits of personalization before going on
to scare-us-silly at the social dangers that filtering engenders.
71. Much the same criticism can be leveled at SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18.
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This naYve assumption of the efficacy of perfect filtering is fundamen-
tally wrong. The section that follows examines the technical mechanisms
by which filtering currently works and then discusses the current research
into successor technologies. The purpose is to identify the difficulty in
building anything resembling perfect filtering and to explain why the
probability of its development is vanishingly small. This is not to argue
that perfect filtering is impossible but rather that it is very hard, and very
unlikely, using currently known technologies.
Anything is possible, of course, and so we must accommodate the
idea that someone could someday build The Daily Me. However, even if
perfect filtering were to work, we would face no greater danger than we do
today from existing "imperfect" filtering. Thus, after discussing the
implausibility of perfect filtering, this Review turns to current methods of
filtering media without Internet technology and asks whether the Internet
poses an increased danger beyond the filtering mechanisms that we cur-
rently possess.72
A. The Implausibility of Perfect Filtering
Computer filtering appears to be an uncanny, magical thing.73 How on
Earth can Amazon make such accurate recommendations about books,
CDs, and DVDs that I might like? There are three different technologies
that constitute current approaches to computer filtering: databases for
"customer-relationship management," collaborative filtering, 4 and ma-
chine learning. 75 These three mechanisms together provide the illusion that
perfect filtering may be within our grasp. However, an understanding of
the technologies shows how difficult, if not impossible, it will be to build
perfect filtering systems. The sections that follow explain why these three
approaches are unlikely to provide the kind of filtering that Sunstein as-
sumes is just around the corner.
72. I do not propose examining the reason why we might support filtering technologies, nor
examine some of the beneficial reasons for using filters. An exhaustive summary is provided in Mark S.
Nadel, Customized Filtering and Extremist Enclaves in Republic.com, 54 STAN. L. REv (forthcoming
2001).
73. As Sunstein notes, "some of the recommendations from Amazon.com and analogous services
are miraculously good, even uncanny." (p. 26).
74. Collaborative filtering is the process of classifying individuals into groups and determining
media (and other) preferences from the other collaborators falling within the same group. It emerged in
the early 1990s. See David Goldberg et al., Using Collaborative Filtering to Weave an Information
Tapestry, Coi~zs. OF THE ACM, Dec. 1992, at 61.
75. Machine learning is the generic name for a series of algorithms that can adapt their output
based on feedback "leaming" processes. See PATRICK HENRY wVINSTON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
441-43 (3d ed. 1992).
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1. Customer Relationships and Databases
For most sites that provide some type of recommendation or have a
filtering mechanism, the technology is not magical; it is very simple. For
example, a large database at Amazon tracks my purchases,76 and it records
that I have bought an Elvis Costello CD, a book on travel to Singapore, a
DVD of Notting Hill starring Julia Roberts, and a cordless power saw.
When I next log in-or more irritatingly, by an unsolicited email-
Amazon recommends that I consider purchasing Elvis Costello's new
album with Anne Sofie von Otter, a book on travel to Singapore's close
neighbor Malaysia, the recent release of Julia Roberts's new movie, The
Mexican, on DVD, and a spare battery for the saw." In order to do this,
Amazon and other online retailers use database systems called Customer
Relationship Management ("CRM") systems.78 CRM packages from
Oracle,79 Siebel, 0 Microsoft,8' or SAV2 easily build a user profile of my
interests based on every single purchase, query, or viewing of a page that I
have undertaken on their site. So, when Elvis Costello releases a new CD,
or the newest Julia Roberts film is released on DVD, it is easy to structure
a query asking for a list of all customers who have bought an Elvis Costello
CD or a DVD starring Julia Roberts and send them an email informing
them of the "wonderful new release that you simply must have!!! !"
Specifying a consumer's interests may seem uncanny, but usually it is
just a prosaic SQL query. 3 This means that, sitting in the Amazon data-
base, there is a table with user purchases of CDs, which looks something
76. The database backend is all I am concerned about. The Internet technology for identifying me
as the purchaser of these products is not important for the purposes of this Review. It is a prosaic
combination of IP address tracking, registration and access control, and cookies. The technology has
been explained elsewhere. See Froomkin, Death of Privacy, supra note 23, at 1486-94.
77. All these recommendations are representative of the many recommendations that I have
received from Amazon. See, e.g., Email from Amazon, to Dan Hunter (Sept. 26, 2001, & Oct. 31,
2001) (on file with author).
78. See CHRIS TODMAN, DESIGNING A DATA WAREHOUSE: SUPPORTING CUSTOMER
RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT 28-30 (2001).
79. See http://www.oracle.com/ip/index.html?content.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2001).
80. See http://www.siebel.com/products/marketing/index.shtm (last visited Aug. 29, 2001).
81. See http://www.greatplains.com/microsoft/ (last visited Aug. 29, 200 1).
82. See http://www.mysap.com/solutions/index.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2001).
83. SQL stands for "Structured Query Language." SQL is the fundamental data definition and
manipulation language for relational databases worldwide. Most proprietary database systems run SQL,
either natively or through the Open Database Connectivity ("ODBC") standard. See JAMES R. GROFF &
PAUL N. WEINBERG, SQL: ThE COMPLETE REFERENCE 30 (1999).
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like the following:84
CD PURCHASES TABLE
Transaction Purchaser CD Title CD Artist Email
No.
103403456 Dan Hunter Painted From Elvis Costello hunterd@wharton.
Memory and Burt upenn.edu
Bacharach
103403457 Cass The Town Hall Louis cass@republic.com
Sunstein Sessions Armstrong
... and so on. I I I
When the new Elvis Costello album is released, Amazon merely que-
ries the database to pull out the names of the purchasers who are in the CD
Purchases table and who have an entry of "CD Artist" containing the words
"Elvis Costello." Then an email is generated informing me, but not Cass
Sunstein, of the new release.
The interesting issue here is the reason why my name was extracted
from the database. As often as not the criterion for pulling my name from
the database is just wrong. The database contains my name because I
bought the CD, DVD, book, or tool. It does not contain my reason for buy-
ing it. It is assumed that the reason I bought the item is linked to the artist,
the actor, and so on. Thus, Amazon's later retrieval of my name in their
subsequent targeted-marketing campaigns proceeds on the basis of my pre-
sumed appreciation for Elvis Costello or of Julia Roberts, or my habit of
traveling to South East Asia, or my power tool obsession." It may not
retrieve my name based on the actual reasons for my earlier purchases. I
may have bought the Elvis Costello album because it was written and per-
formed by my favorite songwriter, Burt Bacharach, not because I like Elvis
Costello. I may have purchased Notting Hill because I admire the writing
of screenwriter Richard Curtis and not because I like Julia Roberts. Maybe
I bought the book on Singapore because I had to go there for work and may
never return to the place. And I might have bought the power saw as a gift
for someone else and have no interest in tools myself.
Thus the data that I purchased something bears no necessary relation-
ship to the reason I purchased it. Negroponte's The Daily Me relies on
84. Actually, under an appropriately normalized SQL database, the table containing my
information (name, email address) would be separated from the table containing the CD purchases. But
this is a technical concern that is not relevant for the purposes of the example.
85. Amazon recently emailed me with the announcement of the DVD release of America's
Sweethearts. The email noted that "[a]s someone who has purchased films starring Julia Roberts, you
might like to know that America's Sweethearts will be released on November 13, 2001 on DVD."
Email from Amazon, supra note 77 (Oct. 31, 2001).
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similar database technology.86 The same type of database that allows
Amazon to keep track of my purchases of CDs, DVDs, books, and tools
must be used by The Daily Me to track my media consumption of
"international news stories," "talk-radio hosts," "reality TV shows,"
"televised college hoops," and so on. The Daily Me requires a serious
commitment to database technology in order to record my preferences,
select the communications I will enjoy, and track whether I have enjoyed
today's media serving. The problem with Amazon's database is present
also in this aspect of The Daily Me. I may have watched something in the
past, but why did I watch it?
One way of becoming slightly more confident of the underlying rea-
son for my wanting a media product, or at least becoming more confident
that I will like a similar product, is relying on data that I bought, listened
to, or watched multiple instances of a similar product. If I always watch
Survivor, or have purchased all of Elvis Costello's albums, or have elected
to receive the Technology section of the New York Times by email, then
chances are good that I have some interest in topics provided by these me-
dia. However, even this method of analysis is rife with errors. I have, in
fact, bought DVDs of Notting Hill and Four Weddings and a Funeral from
Amazon, and will, no doubt, soon buy Bridget Jones's Diary from them.
Amazon will probably be fully confident that I love movies with Hugh
Grant in them, since he is the only actor connecting all three films.8 7
Unfortunately they would be wrong again, since my interest in each is not
Hugh Grant's performance but Richard Curtis's writing; he wrote or cow-
rote all three and, as I said, I like his work.
The problem here is just one of the intractable issues for the commit-
ted "data miner."88 What of the colleague of mine who has a couple of
hundred DVDs, ranging across all categories of films? If Amazon checks
each new Hollywood release it is bound to find one movie he has pur-
chased which shares the same star, director, writer, or casting agent as the
new film. Should they send him an email for every new release, recom-
mending the purchase of "a fantastic new movie you absolutely must
have!!! !"?
Thus, CRM database technology is simple but flawed. The basic prob-
lems involve extracting the underlying interest that is served by the
86. NEGROPONTE, supra note 67, at 153.
87. Shortly after I wrote this, Amazon sent me an email touting the benefits of purchasing
Bridget Jones's Diary on DVD, on the basis of my having bought a movie with Hugh Grant in it. Email
from Amazon, supra note 77 (Sept. 26, 2001).
88. The process of filtering and extracting information from database systems is often called
"data mining." See MICHAEL J. A. BERRY & GORDON LINOFF, MASTERING DATA MINING: THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT 12 (2000). The particular mechanisms
presented here are the filtering mechanisms used in data mining for purposes such as The Daily Me
would require.
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purchase (which might be a physical DVD, or the transmission of college
hoops, or other) and providing some feedback mechanism to update and
improve the information in the database. Databases alone cannot give us
anything resembling perfect filtering because, in short, they do not filter. In
order to do this, we need to look at two main technologies that provide
some of the functionality missing from databases: collaborative filtering
and machine learning."
2. Collaborative Filtering: People Helping One Another Know Stuff
Collaborative filtering is perhaps best summarized by the name of one
of the earliest systems: People Helping One Another Know Stuff, or
PHOAKS. 0 The idea is to match a person whose exact information, tastes,
and interests we do not yet know-let us call him Dan-with people who
are similar in meaningful ways to Dan and whose tastes and interests we do
know. We can therefore use the group to which Dan belongs to filter new
information for Dan. If similar people in his group have found a piece of
information fun or useful or meaningful, then the chances are high that Dan
will also find it fun, useful, or meaningful.91 Hence the term "collaborative
filtering," since all the group members collaborate to filter material for
Dan.
The first stage therefore involves identifying me as similar to others
within a particular group. The task will differ depending on that which is
being filtered, but it will usually involve scrutinizing the records about me
89. We might also identify a third type of filtering technology, manual rule-based systems. These
systems rely on the manual creation and identification of rules that filter out certain types of
information that satisfy the rules applied. Think of so-called "bozo filters" in email systems: one can
set a rule that indicates that every message from a certain individual, certain domain name, or specified
IP number should be immediately trashed. See http://webopedia.lycos.com/TERM/b/bozofilter.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2002). It is possible to extend this sort of filter to the situation of The Daily Me.
However, this is not really a plausible solution to the perfect filtering problem because manual setting
of rules does not give us anything resembling intelligent filtering. It just gives us a set of presets on the
media system and does not automatically adapt to new media choices (which is necessary for perfect
filtering to operate as imagined). See John Huntress, Tool Box: Building a Bozo Filter, AdBanker.com,
at http://vww.adbanter.com/toolbox/tool-box_002.shtml (last visited Jan. 30, 2002). Manual rule-
based systems will not be considered in the sections that follow.
90. See http:/www.phoaks.com//index.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
91. See Summary of Proceedings: Collaborative Filtering Workshop, University of California,
Berkeley, Mar. 16, 1996, available at http:lhvwwv.sims.berkeley.edulresources/collab/collab-report.html
(last visited Aug. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Summary of Proceedings]; Jack Breese et al., Empirical
Analysis of Predictive Algorithms for Collaborative Filtering, Proceedings of the 14th Conference on
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Madison, WI (1998) [hereinafter Breese et al., Empirical
Analysis); David M. Nichols, Implicit Rating and Filtering, Fifth DELOS Workshop on Filtering and
Collaborative Filtering, Budapest, Hungary, Nov. 10-12, 1997, 31-36; Paul Resnick et al.,
GroupLens: An Open Architecture for Collaborative Filtering of Netnews, Proceedings of the
Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, Chapel Hill, NC, 175-86 (1994); Upendra
Shardanand & Patti Maes, Social Information Filtering: Algorithms for Automating "Word of Mouth,"
Proceedings of CHI'95-Human Factors in Computing Systems, 210-17 (1995).
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and then comparing these records with other people's records.92 I can then
be identified as a member of a particular group. So, for example, Amazon
checks my purchasing and browsing habits, as disclosed in the records of
their CRM database. They conclude that I fall into the "Dangerously-
Handsome-and-Witty-Law-Professor Group." So far so good. The next
step is to identify what other people within the group liked and disliked.
This is usually done on the basis of simple purchases ("Other people like
you bought Richard Russo's Empire Falls") or by group members rating
the purchase they made ("Other people like you rated Empire Falls five out
of five stars"). Therefore, in assessing my media needs, the filter notes that
the few other lucky members of the select "Dangerously-Handsome-and-
Witty-Law-Professor Group" all bought copies of Cass Sunstein's latest
book, Republic.com, and they rated it highly. Amazon's email to me
gushes, "Dan, you're gonna love this book! !"
Unfortunately, this technology cannot help construct perfect filtering
systems. Collaborative filtering began as a research field in the early
1990s.93 It was, briefly, the scene of a commercial feeding frenzy and a
white-hot IPO market, followed by a disastrous fall from grace.94 The rea-
son for this sudden attack of sanity on the part of investors was, essentially,
that the techniques just did not deliver on the field's initial early promise.
There are at least two obvious reasons for this failure.
First, it is very hard to work out the group to which anyone belongs.
While I may belong to the "Dangerously-Handsome-and-Witty-Law-
Professor Group" for the purposes of buying technical books, I actually did
not love Republic. com. Perhaps for reasons having to do with my technical
training I did not like it at all. So, for the purposes of this book, I am in a
specialist subgroup, the "Dangerously-Handsome-and-Witty-Law-
Professor-with-a-Computer-Science-and-Cognitive-Psychology-Degree
Group." It is virtually impossible for Amazon to know this. It has yet to be
shown that the feedback loop in collaborative filtering can ever control for
this problem. It just does not work. Further, on the issue of group choice,
the established mappings do not work very well once you move outside the
particular area for which the group was established. For example, let us say
that the law professor group was created based on records from book pur-
chases. And let us further assume that this grouping is fairly good at filter-
ing out useful book choices for me. There is little to suggest that it will be
92. Many different similarity measures can be used to judge how I am similar to others. Indeed,
how best to classify me into one group based on the appropriate similarity metric is, of course, the
crucial question. See Breese et al., EmpiricalAnalysis, supra note 91.
93. Summary of Proceedings, supra note 91.
94. See Janelle Brown, Personalize Me, Baby, SALON.com, April 6, 2001, at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/04/06/personalization/index2.html; Alexei Oreskovic, Flight
of the Firefly, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 6, 2000, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/
0,1902,19669,00.html.
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very accurate at choosing other types of products. I probably do not share
interests in news, music, magazines, movies, or sports with other members
of this group. I may love death metal music, Tour de France cycling, the
early Hitchcock oeuvre (before he moved to America), and line dancing;
but in relation to all these categories, I am probably in a minority of one
within the "Law-Professor Group" that previously identified my book
choices so accurately.
Even if we could solve this problem, which so far has eluded all
attempts, there is a second snag for collaborative filtering: people change.
When I was young I loved Agatha Christie novels. I am pleased to say that
I no longer do. I moved on to other mystery writers, like Elmore Leonard,
Peter Temple, Michael Connelly, and James Lee Burke. However, with the
exception of Peter Temple, I find that I enjoy mystery writers less than I
used to enjoy them. Collaborative filtering assumes a degree of fixity in the
preferences of the group members: you were once a lover of Star Trek,
you are now a lover of Star Trek, you will always be a lover of Star Trek.
Unless all other members of the group mysteriously also tire of being trek-
kers, then the suggestions from this filtering will somehow always involve
Captain Kirk, Mr. Spock, Captain Picard, and Commander Data.95
These two problems identified above, group specification and chang-
ing preferences, lead to the most important reason why collaborative filter-
ing cannot ever become perfect filtering. Collaborative filtering was never
intended to be perfect filtering. It is always assumed that, in any collabora-
tive filtering implementation, the user will have access to other sources of
material.96 Developers have realized that if the user was not able to break
outside the strictures of the collaborative filter then the filters would
become useless. As we become bored with Agatha Christie novels or Star
Trek reruns, we will search for other material. And my membership in cer-
tain groups is correspondingly altered, I am removed from the Agatha
Christie group altogether and now included in a new grouping of people
who like HBO's Six Feet Under. Collaborative filtering can, therefore,
remove some of the media choices that plague us, but it cannot be perfect
filtering as Sunstein envisions.
3. Machine Learning
The other main type of potentially-applicable technology is a subdis-
cipline of artificial intelligence called machine learning.97 We need not
95. Or whatever their appropriate titles may be. (Email flames from trekkers can be directed to
the email address noted in the dagger footnote above.).
96. Summary of Proceedings, supra note 91.
97. For an introduction to artificial intelligence, see WINSTON, supra note 75, at 441-503; MARK
STEInK, INTRODUCTION TO KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS 19-145 (1995); see also JOHN ZELEZNIKOW & DAN
HUNTER, BUILDING INTELLIGENT LEGAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS: REPRESENTATION AND REASONING
I LAw (1994) (discussing artificial intelligence in law); Dan Hunter, Near Knowledge: Inductive
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examine each type of machine learning, as the general features of neural
networks provide us with enough information to assess machine-learning
approaches to the area.98
Neural networks are not "neural" in any sense, except metaphorically.
They operate on computers like other computational algorithms. 99 They are
tagged "neural" because they operate in a way that seems to be similar to
the way the brain works. They typically involve a set of input pathways
and a set of output pathways. Between the input and output there are a
series of connections that have a weight attached to them and a series of
nodes that have an activation level attached to them.100 The inputs are acti-
vated, and this activation is propagated to the intermediate nodes via the
connections. Each one of these intermediate nodes sums the strength of the
signal entering it from these connections, and if it is greater than the activa-
tion level of the node then it "fires," passing its signal on to the next one in
the chain.1"' Through this series of activations, some of the output nodes
are activated and a "result" ensues.
The interesting point is how the system "learns," since this is the way
that a perfect filtering system can decide whether I will enjoy a new movie,
video-game, TV series, and so on. Say we have a neural network that is
supposed to learn whether I will like a newly released movie. We start with
a series of inputs individually describing any number of movie attributes.
These might include, at the highest level, the genre of the movie, for exam-
ple, "romantic-comedy," "martial-arts-adventure," "actioner," "splatter-
flick," and so forth. Then we might include inputs for the actors, "Julia
Roberts," "Jackie Chan," "Keanu Reeves," as well as for the director,
screenwriter, and casting agent. We can include inputs for plotline fea-
tures: "twist ending," "obvious, three-act structure," and so on. We also
have all of our internal nodes that initially are set with random weights and
activation strengths. And finally, we have some output nodes that represent
how much I will like the movie: from "Dan will love this" and "Dan will
find this wryly amusing" to "Dan is gonna hate everything about this
movie."
Learning Systems in Law, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9, 1522-1687 (2000) (analyzing the applicability of
inductive learning algorithm within law), available at http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue3/
v5i3a09-Hunter.html; Dan Hunter, Out of Their Minds: Legal Theory in Neural Networks, 7
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 129-51 (1999) (discussing the applicability of neural networks in
law) [hereinafter Hunter, Minds]; Dan Hunter, Commercialising Legal Neural Networks, 2 J. INFO.
LAW & TECH. (1996), at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/Artiflnt/2hunter/default.htm [hereinafter Hunter,
Commercialising].
98. The most important consideration here is how the system learns. This is broadly the same
process (though the mechanics differ) for all machine learning systems. WINSTON, supra note 75, at
445.
99. Hunter, Minds, supra note 97, at 129-31; Hunter, Commercialising, supra note 97.
100. Hunter, Minds, supra note 97, at 130-32.
101. There are many variants, but this is representative of all neural networks. See WINSTON,
supra note 75, at 443-44.
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We then classify a given movie using all these inputs. If it is Rush
Hour, the inputs for "martial-arts-adventure," "Jackie Chan," "comedy,"
and so forth are activated. An output is generated, based on the internal
random weightings and activation levels. It generates an output of
"dislike."' 2 However, I vaguely enjoyed Rush Hour, and so this informa-
tion is provided to the system in a process called "back-propagation." ' 3
This means that the internal weights and activations are changed until the
inputs for Rush Hour lead to an output of "Dan liked this movie in a kinda
take-it-or-leave-it way." We perform this operation for every movie ever
released, cycling over and over again, until we have a set of weightings and
activations that accurately encodes all of the data. When Rush Hour 2 is
released, the system should accurately predict that "Dan will like this
movie a bit less than the original."'" In theory it should also be able to tell
me how I will feel about movies as varied as Memento, Moulin Rouge,
Pearl Harbor, and A Beautiful Mind.
The various different types of machine learning are all reliant on this
sort of identification of relevant input criteria followed by some sort of
learning through a feedback loop."' It is here that the myth of machine-
based perfect filtering starts to unravel. First, the learning is only as good
as the initial input criteria, and these criteria can only code for those fea-
tures that have previously been identified.'0 6 As new genres and actors
emerge, the system does not accurately reflect my preferences. For exam-
ple, until I saw The Matrix I had a strong dislike for Keanu Reeves, and I
had never heard of Carrie-Anne Moss. Any system rating this movie
probably would have considered both my dislike for Keanu and my enjoy-
ment of martial arts movies and split the difference, concluding that I
would like it a little. After all, I had never seen a movie that fits into the
102. Because the initial settings are random, the output could be any one of the possible outcomes,
for example, "hate," "really dislike," "dislike," "indifferent," "like," "really like," "love," etc.
103. WINSTON, supra note 75, at 443.
104. Sequels are not much of a stretch for this sort of system. Hollywood makes sequels so that
they are as close as possible to the successful originals. I was bored out of my mind by Jurassic Park 1I,
and so it is going to come as little surprise that I slept through Jurassic Park 11. (Of course, this does
not explain how Alien and Aliens can be so compelling, while Alien 3 and Alien 4 were tedious.) A
more difficult task is assessing whether, based on my enjoyment of Rush Hour, I will enjoy a somewhat
similar film with different actors (Kiss of the Dragon, with Jet Li), a different type of film (Memento)
or even a new genre (science-fiction romantic comedy, perhaps?). We do not need to complicate the
issue here.
105. WINSTON, supra note 75, at 443.
106. There is another practical technique for getting sufficient feedback for learning, a feature that
Amazon's machine learning system demonstrates. Amazon allows me to rate a recommendation it has
provided, which is then fed back into its recommendation system. I doubt that I am the only person who
has never told them how I feel about their recommendations, which are almost uniformly wrong. I do
not consider this to be a theoretical problem with any "machine-learning-as-perfect-filtering" thesis. It
is, however, a serious practical consideration that has no obvious solution, and which casts further
doubt on the thesis.
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"dystopian, science-fiction, reality-as-Plato's-cave-thesis, martial arts"
genre.
This is not a problem that can be solved by saying someone misidenti-
fied the correct inputs: the correct inputs simply did not exist until that
movie. Furthermore, just as with the collaborative filtering approach, the
machine learning approach cannot deal with my becoming bored with a
series, genre, or actor. Machine learning is, by necessity, based on a past
history. It cannot account for the fact that I no longer like a genre, or that I
will love a brand-new genre. Genre is not the only criterion that
changes: what of the new actress of whom I had previously never heard,
but who I now think is the best thing since the invention of espresso? The
hitherto wonderful actor who has become tedious? The hack director who
suddenly gets it right?
Machine-based mechanisms for filtering, like the human-based
mechanisms in collaborative filtering, can provide some basis for suggest-
ing that I will enjoy a particular type of media content. But, like the human
systems, they simply will not lead to perfect filtering. Perfect filtering
assumes that the system gets it right all the time. I am never tempted to turn
off the media I am experiencing right now because there is nothing better
out there. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, none of the technologies
that we have at our disposal presently can come close to perfect filtering.
4. Imperfect Filtering
Perfect filtering is not completely impossible. Who knows what may
happen in the future? The problem with Sunstein's argument however is
that his facile assumption of perfect filtering is based on very shaky sci-
ence. It is based on a conceit that was convenient for Negroponte to peddle
to the potential funders of Media Lab activities, but which has proved very
hard to develop. Examining the filtering technology, we see little evidence
that Sunstein's dystopian vision of perfect filtering is likely. Since Sunstein
simply assumes that perfect filtering is going to occur, he does not even
bother to try to persuade the reader that this eventuality will come to pass.
In the end, there is nothing in Republic. com that gives the reader reason to
conclude that Sunstein is right.
A riposte to the previous analysis would be to say that Republic.com
does not rely on perfect filtering; imperfect filtering and a reduction in our
access to media content would lead to the same result. At a few points in
his narrative, Sunstein makes such a claim (p. 98). He suggests that shared
experiences will not completely disappear, and that the Internet can pro-
mote sharing and community (pp. 15-16, 98-99). Nonetheless, he con-
cludes that this does not invalidate his fundamental concern (pp. 16, 99).
Unfortunately for his argument, a small number of "lawyerly" qualifi-
cations do not change the fact that his entire work is built on the uncertain
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foundation of perfect filtering. If perfect filtering can provide nothing other
than slightly fewer choices on cable television,"0 7 then it is not going to
lead to any of the terrible social ills that Sunstein foretells. If perfect filter-
ing is really just slightly-better-than-we-have-now filtering, then his whole
tale unravels.
The obvious rejoinder then is that I have only described current tech-
nologies and not what might be possible in the future. And of course this is
true. Anything is possible. In a hundred years there may be quantum-level
computers that can read my thoughts, build a cognitive model of me, accu-
rately assess all media content, and provide me with exactly what I want.0 8
But by then we will probably be living as brains-in-vats, and the problems
we face will be more serious than the ones foretold by Professor Sunstein.
For all that we might engage in science fiction about man-machine mind
melds and other ridiculously implausible possibilities, the fact remains that
there is no technology that we currently know of that can even remotely
approach the type of perfect filtering that Republic.com assumes.
Sunstein's conclusions fail as a result of his mistaken initial premise.
Some skeptics may still believe that some slight variation of perfect
filtering is possible. Or perhaps they would just wish to engage in a
Gedankenexperiment: "What if," they say, "perfect filtering were
possible? Would your view of Republic.com differ then?""1 9 My answer is
that we already have essentially the same degree of media sifting that per-
fect filtering would give us. And we have yet to see the kind of apocalyptic
extremism that Sunstein envisages.
B. The Reality of Today's Daily Me
The year is 2001 A.D. My clock radio awakens me in the morning. It
is set to a radio station that I like. I eat breakfast while reading a magazine
or newspaper to which I subscribe. I travel to work listening to MP3s I
downloaded after I heard the songs on my favorite radio station in the
morning."0 At work I read professional journals that are relevant to my job
and listen to a streaming-media radio station that plays the same sort of
music that I listen to in the morning. At night I watch the network news
and movies from a cable movie channel, based on my preference for
107. See Gates, TV Guide, supra note 69.
108. If this happens, let me say right now that I retract everything that I have argued in this
section.
109. Sunstein has said as much, both in a personal email to the author and in the Afterword to the
paperback edition of Republic.com. See infra Part VLA; Email from Cass Sunstein, to Dan Hunter
(Sept. 10, 2001) (on file with author).
110. Some of which I have even purchased.
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certain types of movies."' I go to sleep reading books recommended from
the radio, from friends, or from the magazines to which I subscribe.
At first blush, it is hard to see how this state of affairs differs from the
completely illusory perfect filtering hypothesis that Sunstein fears so
greatly. In the year 2001, I filter out a huge range of media. I have never
seen more than five (agonizingly long) minutes of a musical. To the best of
my knowledge, I have never listened to a country-and-western radio sta-
tion. I do not subscribe to right-wing political journals and do not have to
work hard not to find them in my dentist's office. Yet, according to
Sunstein, somehow what I do now is so qualitatively different from what
would occur under the (fictional) The Daily Me that we must act immedi-
ately to regulate away the terrifying prospect of extremism and social bal-
kanization."2 How can this be so?
The difference, urges Republic.com, is that we will no longer have
shared media spaces. We will not be exposed to other ideas. Specifically,
we will no longer have access to the public fora which are General Interest
Intermediaries such as newspapers, current affairs magazines, TV news,
and so on. It is not enough that some people will still be curious and seek
out these types of intermediaries in a perfect-filtering world; rather, every-
one must have access to them (pp. 15-16), otherwise we have murderous
group extremism and the collapse of democracy.
This is just silly. If we already have effective media filtering for most
people, then surely it is an empirical question as to whether additional fil-
tering is going to lead to extremism. However, Sunstein does not see it is
as an empirical question: access to these General Interest Intermediaries
appears as a fundamental requirement of civil society and to reduce access
to them is untenable. For someone committed to empirical answers to other
types of questions,"' this is an odd position for Sunstein to take.
At the heart of this concern is the idea that the Internet will remove
the public park and sidewalk. Sunstein talks about the importance of these
places. They are vital in order that we be forced to confront alternate
views, that we be allowed to demonstrate in front of City Hall, and so on
(pp. 31-32). The "public-park-and-sidewalk" trope is, of course, a favorite
of First Amendment jurisprudence and holds a place dear to the heart of
111. And with the purchase of my new TiVo recorder, not only will I never miss the programs I
want, but I will also be able to skip those pesky public interest announcements and newsflashes about
the war in Afghanistan.
112. Sunstein recognizes that we already filter media content, but suggests that what we will see
with perfect filtering is somehow conceptually different from this (pp. 10-12).
113. See, e.g., Schkade et al., Dollars, supra note 9, at 1160-71 (applying empirical techniques in
examining jury deliberations and concluding that empirical studies call into question our assumptions
of the merits of jury deliberation); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000) (examining compensatory and punitive damages awards in jury decision
making).
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U.S. constitutional lawyers.'1 4 Thus, we see the analogy uncomfortably
transported into cyberspace, with Sunstein and others arguing that we must
protect these constitutional values in the online world (pp. 27-37, 189).15
Though it is unobjectionable to argue in favor of public fora within
cyberspace, Sunstein's use of it here is very odd. Cyberspace is the most
public of communications fora. For the cost of a cup of coffee you can par-
ticipate in online chatrooms, email discussions, Usenet newsgroups, and
other online discussion environments. For the cost of a pizza, you can have
a website which everyone in the world can see. Want the world to see your
grievance against the government, politicians, companies, or individuals?
You got it. Unlike the tightly controlled commercial media with which we
are currently "blessed," the Internet provides cheap, easy, international pro-
liferation of information. It is an unparalleled virtual sidewalk. We do not
have public access like this to newspapers, cable television, radio, or any
other of the media sources that we currently enjoy. Yet Sunstein suggests
that commercial operators of General Interest Intermediaries, vast media
conglomerates like NewsCorp and AOL-Time Warner, are somehow more
important "sidewalks" than the completely open Internet that we currently
have.1 6
The response of Sunstein (and Andrew Shapiro, from whom this
argument is largely derived)" 7 is that perfect filtering of information means
that even if it is easy to build a website, no one will see it. It will not matter
if the dissident website proprietor emails people, because that will be fil-
tered out too. The same holds for instant messaging, chatrooms, and other
Internet communications." 58
114. See J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DuKE LJ. 375, 399 (1990) (tracing the origin of the public forum doctrine).
115. See also LESSIG, CODE, supra note 17, at 69-71; SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note
18, at 124-32; Noah D. Zatz, Note, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the
Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 200-19 (1998) (arguing for the application of the
public forum doctrine in cyberspace).
116. I am not arguing here that the Net is a perfectly accessible medium. The national and
international digital divide is real, and the poor typically do not have access to the Net. However, the
Net's accessibility is orders of magnitude greater than television. Though network television ad rates
vary dramatically, the costs of airtime for a thirty-second commercial (aired once) are between $60,000
and $250,000 during normal programming. See Ronald Goettler, Advertising Rates, Audience
Composition, and Competition in the Network Television Industry 20 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), available at http:llwww.gsia.cmu.edulandrew/goettler/papers/ad-GSIA-1999-E28.pdf
(last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
117. SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 124-27.
118. Id. As Shapiro argues:
What may be most distressing about total filtering, then, is the way it could solidify a trend
toward the elimination of spaces where citizens can confront and engage one another. Of
course, it's always been the case that some speakers have a hard time getting noticed, and this
is not always a lamentable fact. The difference, though, is one of opportunity.
Id. at 127.
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As my discussion of perfect filtering demonstrates, this is a fear that is
solidly grounded in the bedrock of bad science fiction. Perfect filtering just
cannot filter in the way that Sunstein and Shapiro fear. Moreover, we might
ask why is it that the Net is singled out for such approbation? We do not
see either Sunstein or Shapiro campaigning against the much less open
media environments of television, radios, or newspapers. Why is it that the
Internet is so different from other media sources? Finally, and I think most
tellingly, it is useful to remember that no matter what happens online we
still have the "real world." Even if everything that these second-generation
scholars suggest actually did come to pass, Thomas Paine can still take up
a placard outside the physical object of his unhappiness," 9 whether this be
the unfair employer, the unrepresentative city hall, or whatever. The Net,
even the perfectly filtered Net, does not remove us from the real, physical
world, where all of our usual freedoms exist without reference to cyber-
space. 120
For all his discussion of sidewalks, airports, and parks, when discuss-
ing why we should fear perfect filtering, Sunstein forgets about the influ-
ence of external sources on our filtering of media. These external sources
have a fundamental effect on our media choices. I learn about good films,
books, and magazines from colleagues, billboards, free city papers, over-
heard discussions on the bus, and so on. The same is true of the real subject
of Sunstein's worries: extreme political concerns. Political debate does not
usually occur when I read The New Republic, and, disagreeing with an
author, start shouting at the magazine. Politics happens when a friend, col-
league, political rival, or chance-passerby says something with which I
agree or disagree, and the argument rages from there.
Sunstein forgets, or simply ignores, the real world, which will always
impinge on media choices and will always provide the public sidewalks
that he fears will disappear in cyberspace. Whether or not in the future we
end up with a perfectly-filtered Net, we will face exactly the same situation
that we face today. We already have the effective equivalent of The Daily
Me. Most people do not read all books. Most people may not read outside
the relatively narrow scope they know they like. Most people do not read
the New York Times, Le Monde, The Australian, or any other "balanced"
General Interest Intermediaries. Perhaps this is to be regretted. But we
119. Shapiro uses an example of a man called Paine who builds a website www.paine.com. Id. at
124-27.
120. As Polk Wagner has noted to me, this is correct only to the extent that we spend a measurable
part of our lives in realspace. Email form Polk Wagner to Dan Hunter (October 10, 2001). As we spend
more time online, this answer is weakened. This counterargument is absolutely correct, but I am
suspicious (as Polk is) of suggestions that we are living a significant fraction of our lives online.
Though true for a very small number of people, I doubt that the life online versus life offline ratio is
very troubling for most people. And I doubt that this ratio is likely to increase significantly for many,
many years.
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should not assume that the Internet, or the illusory phantom of perfect fil-
tering, is going to change the real world at all.
What Sunstein's fear of filtering ignores is that we do not live in the
environment of the early-nineteenth century. Our problem lies not in a
reduction in the amount of data we receive. A reduction in information is
our only possible salvation. I receive about fifty emails a day. If I go away
on vacation for a week, I spend the next three weeks clearing out my
in-box. It seems that I have to read hundreds of journals, books, and arti-
cles each week. I am constantly bombarded with ads, teasers for films,
political commentary, stock quotes, gossip, and weather information.
David Shenk calls this "data smog." He notes that vast reams of informa-
tion are making us more stressed, less informed, and less effective. 21 The
amount of information I have to process in the early twenty-first century is
so vast and multifarious that if I do not filter it my brain will fry. Despite
this, Sunstein offers me a paean to the virtues of more information, not
less. And to make things worse, he wraps up this unhelpful advice in the
flag of democracy.
III
FEAR OF GRouPs
When, Athenians, will you take the necessary action? What are you
waiting for? Until you are compelled, I presume. But what are we
to think of what is happening now? For my own part I think that for
a free people there can be no greater compulsion than shame for
their position. Or tell me, are you content to run round and ask one
another, "Is there any news today?" Could there be any news more
startling than that a Macedonian is triumphing over Athenians and
settling the destiny of... [Greece]?
Demosthenes, First Philippic121
If there is any news more startling than that a Macedonian was tri-
umphing over Athens, then it is surely that a leading democratic theorist
should argue that group discussion and deliberation are bad things.
Startling though this may be, it is nonetheless true.
The central fear of Republic.com is a fear of groups. More particu-
larly, Sunstein fears the polarizing effect of groups upon the decision mak-
ing and thinking of their members. Sunstein has explained that he decided
to study the Net after discussions with Lawrence Lessig, but noted that his
concerns solidified when he connected his work on jury decision making 123
121. DAVID SHENK, DATA SMOG: SURVIVING THE INFORMATION GLUT 33-50 (1997) (explaining
that the generation and dissemination of data is overwhelming our ability to process it).
122. DEMOSTHENES, First Philippic, supra note 6, para. 10.
123. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note 9. See also Schkade et al., Dollars, supra note 9.
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with the Internet." 4 Sunstein's work on jury decision making looked at the
social psychology research about group polarization. The effect occurs
when people deliberate in groups. It has been shown that after deliberation,
group members generally move towards more extreme viewpoints than
those that they initially held.'25 This effect is now well documented and
uncontroversial. 126 What is controversial and problematic is Sunstein's use
of this research. Sunstein says, in essence, that group deliberation causes
extremism (pp. 62-75). If Sunstein's thesis were true, then not only would
a philippic against the Internet be warranted, but we would justifiably be
suspicious of the results of any group decision making. In fact, if
Sunstein's thesis were true then, frankly, we would not let more than two
people congregate in one place at one time, First Amendment or no First
Amendment. And we would do away with juries altogether.'27
Luckily, this interpretation of group polarization is not particularly
well supported by the social psychology research. Sunstein is not wrong in
identifying the group polarization effect, but his use of it is problematic. He
fails to give due regard to the fact that, at times, groups actually depolarize
and move to less extreme positions, or they move to "extreme" positions
that are actually moderate. Further, he fails to establish that the conditions
for group polarization are actually present in the Net entities that he identi-
fies as so worrying. And finally, he draws a series of conclusions that may
or may not be correct about Internet polarization, but for which he has no
evidence. The sections that follow explain each of these problems, but first,
it is important to understand how the group polarization effect comes
about, and what the research into it actually says.
A. The "Risky Shift"
In 1961, James Stoner, a graduate student undertaking a master's
degree in industrial management at MIT, undertook some unusual experi-
ments, 8 which surely rank as some of the most surprisingly influential
master's research of all time.'29 The conventional wisdom of the time
124. Carl S. Kaplan, Law Professor Sees Hazard in Personalized News, New York Times on the
web (Apr. 13, 2001), at http:l/www.nytimes.com/2001/O4/13/technology/13CYBERLAW.html (last
visited Aug. 29, 2001).
125. JOHN SABINI, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 35 (2d ed. 1995); ROGER BROwN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
THE SECOND EDITION 200-12 (1986).
126. SABINI, supra note 125, at 35.
127. Sunstein's recent work on mistakes in jury deliberations and awards might actually provide
some basis for such an argument. See generally Schkade et al., Dollars, supra note 9.
128. James A. F. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decisions Involving Risk (1961)
(unpublished master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Stoner was not looking for the
shift in groups, and the seminal analysis of the risky shift is found in another work. See BROWN, supra
note 125, at 202-03.
129. It is hard to think of another masters thesis that invented a field of study and led to literally
hundreds of experiments and articles. See SABINI, supra note 125, at 35.
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within industrial management was that group decisions tended to be more
conservative than the decisions of the individuals of the group.13 His fairly
unremarkable starting point was thus to demonstrate this empirically. What
he discovered was the exact opposite: group decisions were riskier than
those of the group members as individuals. Participants in the study were
asked, for example, to advise an engineer whether he should quit a secure
job for a riskier, but better paying, one. The participants were asked at what
risk level should the engineer take the offer (10% chance of the risky job
continuing, 20%, 30%, and so on). The mean of the individual risk assess-
ments of group members prior to group deliberation was significantly
lower than the eventual group assessment of the same risk after delibera-
tion. Hundreds of studies subsequently established this as a persistent phe-
nomenon,13 1 and it came to be known as the "risky shift.' '1 32
In many subsequent studies the concept of risky shifts within groups
was shown to operate in contexts outside risk assessments. 133 For example,
moderately profeminist women became more feminist postdiscussion, 134
and moderately anti-American French students became more anti-
American. 35 It has been shown to operate in domains ranging from moral
decisions about the appropriateness of the death penalty, l3 6 to preferences
over which sport is better, football or basketball. 137 The standard formula-
tion of the effect is that group polarization occurs when an initial tendency
of individual group members towards a given direction is enhanced follow-
ing group discussion.131
Sunstein does not mention the risky shift because group polarization
is a more general characterization of the phenomenon. 39 However, there is
one aspect of group polarization that undermines Sunstein's conclusions,
which can be seen best by using the risky shift as an example. It is called
the "cautious shift."'140 Though the majority of questions in the early studies
130. Id. at 33.
131. Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1141, 1142-44 (1986) [hereinafter Isenberg, Group Polarization]
(critically reviewing all the group polarization literature, and proposing social comparison and
persuasive argumentation mechanisms operate together to create the effect).
132. Id. at 1142.
133. For the first explication of group polarization outside the "risky shift," see Serge Moscovici
& Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes, 12 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 125
(1969). See also Isenberg, Group Polarization, supra note 131, at 1142-43 (reviewing the literature on
group polarization); BROWN, supra note 125, at 222-29.
134. David G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 Huai. REL. 699, 703, 711
(1975).
135. Moscovici & Zavalloni, supra note 133, at 125, 131.
136. Amimm Vinokur & Eugene Bumstein, Depolarization of Attitudes in Groups, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYcHoL. 872, 884-85 (1978) [hereinafter Vinokur & Burnstein, Depolarization].
137. Id. at 880, 884.
138. Isenberg, Group Polarization, supra note 131, at 1141-43.
139. BROWN, supra note 125, at 200-26.
140. Id. at 208-12.
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produced a risky shift, there were a number of questions that produced
much more cautious answers upon group deliberation. 4 These questions
were characterized by a very large stake (happiness in marriage, life, and
death of an individual) where other people's interests were also in issue.'
Here polarization occurred, but in the opposite direction from the expected
risky outcome. The group was more cautious than the individuals compris-
ing the group. The salient point here is that polarization need not involve
the "extremism" that Sunstein characterizes all polarization to involve. It
may be that a cautious shift is a shift to the extreme of "caution"; however,
this extreme is one that, in many cases, we would see as desirable, and not
"extreme" at all.
We must be careful then not to see all shifts as inevitably towards an
undesirable extreme. This is, however, just the first of many issues that we
might have with Sunstein's use of group polarization. To understand other
problems with his application of the research, we need to examine why
group polarization works in the first place. There are two fundamental, and
often complementary, theories of why group polarization occurs: Social
Comparison Theory'43 and Persuasive Argument Theory.'" Sunstein men-
tions these theories (pp. 67-71), but he does not clutter his narrative with
detailed analyses of them. However, the specifics of these theories are
important because the details of each of them causes serious problems for
Republic.com.
1. Social Comparison Theory
Social Comparison Theory ("SCT"), first proposed by Leon Festinger,
posits that group polarization occurs because people wish to be perceived
in a socially desirable way, and so they process how others behave and
adjust their self-presentation to maximize their social desirability. 45 Hence,
this leads to the risky shift, as people try to present themselves as holding a
position more socially desirable than that which they originally held.'46
141. Questions five and twelve of Stoner's initial study fell into this category. See Stoner, supra
note 128; see also Allan I. Teger & Dean G. Pruitt, Components of Group Risk Taking, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 200-05 (1967) (identifying a number of other questions that
produced the same effect and classified the criteria that lead to the cautious shift); Isenberg, Group
Polarization, supra note 131, at 1141 (concluding that the novel argument pool available to the group
influences whether a shift is risky or cautious).
142. BROWN, supra note 125, at 209-11.
143. Isenberg, Group Polarization, supra note 131, at 1141.
144. Id. The complementary aspect is controversial; against this Brown suggests that both operate
together. See BROWN, supra note 125, at 212-13. This is not important for our purposes.
145. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117 (1954)
(recounting the development and evidence of SCT).
146. See Isenberg, Group Polarization, supra note 131, at 1142 (noting that stronger versions of
the SCT suggest that people wish to portray themselves as more favorable than the average tendency in
the group). This is not necessary for SCT to operate and the specific metes and bounds of SCT are
beyond the scope of this Review.
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Sunstein, of course, recognizes the SCT and uses it as the basis for
much of his discussion about group polarization on the Internet (pp. 68-
69). Imagine an Internet-based group that clearly holds an objectionable
view: it is homophobic, anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi, or whatever. Members of
this group correspond via chatroom, web, and email. Those who hold
slightly less extreme views adjust their viewpoint in the direction of the
group and gain social standing as a result. Others follow, and so extremism
breeds even greater extremism.
At face value, SCT seems to suggest that Sunstein is correct, and that
group deliberation online leads to extremism. However, both the theory
and the data supporting it are more nuanced than this reading indicates.
Even after accepting the SCT, one has to ask how the process of risky
shifting operates. Here there are two competing hypotheses: the
"bandwagon-effect hypothesis" and the "pluralistic-ignorance hypothe-
sis." ''  The bandwagon effect suggests that people desire to be seen by
group members to be more extreme ("better") than others in the direction
favored by the group. 48 The individual determines the group norm and the
preferred position, and she shifts her position to be "better" than the mean
on this issue. By doing so, she improves her standing within the group. If
extreme is "good" then more extreme is "better." This hypothesis focuses
on the shift in position, assuming that the subject's initial declaration of
position-that is, the predeliberation position-is an accurate reflection of
the person's thinking on the issue.
147. These two hypotheses are comingled in a number of other approaches, such as the cultural
value approach. Lawrence K. Hong, Risky Shift and Cautious Shift: Some Direct Evidence on the
Cultural-Value Theory, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 342, 342, 345 (1978). See also Dean G. Pruitt, Choice Shifts
in Group Discussion: An Introductory Review, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 339, 340, 349
(1971) (comingling with release mechanisms); Dean G. Pruitt, Conclusions: Towardan Understanding
of Choice Shifts in Group Discussion, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 495, 502 (1971); Jerald M.
Jellison, Social Comparison ofAbilities: A Self-Presentation Approach to Decision-Making in Groups,
in SOCIAL COMPARISON PROCESSES: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 235-58 (J. Suls & R.
Miller eds., 1977) (comingling with self-presentation processes); James A. F. Stoner, Risky and
Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions: The Influence of Widely Held Views, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 442 (1968) (comingling with specific values approaches); Festinger, supra note 145
(comingling with self-anchoring); Roger Brown, Further Comment on the Risky Shift, 29 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 468, 469 (1974) (examining nonrisky shift situations) [hereinafter Brown, Further
Comment]; Isenberg, Group Polarization, supra note 131, at 1142.
148. "To be virtuous... is to be different from the mean-in the right direction and to the right
degree." Brown, Further Comment, supra note 147, at 469. See also Howard L. Fromkin, Effects of
Experimentally Aroused Feelings of Undistinctiveness upon Valuation of Scarce and Novel
Experiences, 16 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 521, 529 (1970) (discussing underlying social
factors on preferences for scarce experiences); David G. Myers, Polarizing Effects of Social
Comparison, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 554, 556 (1978) (defending SCT as the basis for
group polarization); David G. Myers et al., Does Learning Others' Opinions Change One's Opinions?,
6 PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 253, 253-56 (1980) (discussing evidence of knowledge of
others' opinions as good evidence of SCT rather than PAT); David G. Myers et al., Attitude
Comparison: Is There Ever a Bandwagon Effect?, 7 J. ApP. Soc. PSYCHOL. 341, 346-47 (1977)
(explaining studies on the bandwagon effect upon merely learning others' attitudes).
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Sunstein implicitly subscribes to the bandwagon hypothesis when he
writes about the group "causing" the shift (pp. 65-69). However, the sec-
ond explanation for SCT suggests that the group does not cause the shift at
all. The "pluralistic-ignorance hypothesis" focuses not on the postdelibera-
tion shift, but rather on the subject's initial declaration of position.'49 Faced
with having to declare a position in a situation of potential group delibera-
tion, the subject is faced with a difficult path to tread. Here there are two
competing tendencies: a desire to state one's true position, and a desire not
to deviate from the (unknown) group norm. Operating within these con-
straints, and in a state of ignorance, the individual initially underestimates
the group norm and declares a position less extreme than her actual posi-
tion. During group deliberation, the individual is exposed to the group
norm, which is actually more extreme than her initial guess. So the subject
becomes free to declare her initially-held, more extreme position. Thus,
group deliberation does not actually alter the individual's position, which
remains constant throughout. Rather, group deliberation frees her to
declare her true position, which she initially withheld. When each member
of the group undertakes this process, the overall group tendency will be
towards the more "extreme" position.'s5
The major difference in these explanations of the SCT is that the
bandwagon effect and the pluralistic-ignorance hypotheses do not ascribe
the same causal connection between the group and the shift. In the band-
wagon effect hypothesis, the group causes the shift in the subject. In the
pluralistic-ignorance hypothesis, the shift was always there but was only
exposed and validated by the group deliberation. These two explanations of
SCT are important to any assessment of the merits of Sunstein's argument.
If the bandwagon-effect hypothesis is correct, then we might agree with
Sunstein that the group deliberation causes extremism. However, if the ig-
norance hypothesis is correct, then the group does not cause any extrem-
ism. It merely provides the means by which the existing views of
individuals can be expressed.
It would be helpful if we could determine which of these two
hypotheses were correct, but unfortunately there appears to be no way of
149. George Levinger & David J. Schneider, Test of the "Risk Is a Value" Hypothesis, 11 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 165, 168-69 (1969) (explaining evidence of the existence of a more
general phenomenon than risky shift, labeled "choice shift"); Pruitt, supra, note 147, 340 (discussing
evidence of both PAT and SCT in risky shift); Harold E. Schroeder, The Risky Shift as a General
Choice Shift, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 298-99 (1973) (discussing risky shift as an
instance of a general phenomenon involving conflict and compromise with values); Daniel J. Isenberg,
Levels of Analysis of Pluralistic Ignorance Phenomena: The Case of Receptiveness to Interpersonal
Feedback, 10 J. App. Soc. PSYCHOL. 457,467 (1980) (analyzing pluralistic ignorance hypothesis).
150. Isenberg, Group Polarization, supra note 131, at 1142.
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determining this experimentally. 5 ' The result is that we do not know
whether Sunstein is right and probably can never know. While this does
not suggest that he is wrong in his use of group polarization, it does
suggest that the application of the theory is more complex than his account
indicates. He may turn out to be right in assuming that the bandwagon
effect hypothesis will rule in cyberspace, but it is just as likely that the plu-
ralistic-ignorance effect will apply.
Furthermore, there is a second concern with Sunstein's reliance on the
SCT. For SCT to produce group polarization, group members must identify
with other members of the group who hold more extreme views. 152 This
requirement was first identified in relation to the risky shift where studies
identified that subjects considered that risk taking was an admirable qual-
ity, and those who were riskier held higher status within the group. It is not
clear from Sunstein's account whether this precondition will ever be found
in the groups that he suggests will form online. It may be that the particular
form of extremism that Sunstein fears will be considered admirable within
the groups created by the Internet. However, it is an open question, and one
for which Sunstein presents no evidence.
Sunstein's account, while not actually wrong, fails to consider all of
the criteria necessary for the conclusions he argues are inevitable. There
are reasons, therefore, to doubt the generalizations that Sunstein makes
from the SCT literature. We see the same issue emerging when examining
the other theory explaining group polarization.
2. Persuasive Argument Theory
The second major theory of group polarization is the Persuasive
Argument Theory ("PAT").153 Unlike the SCT, this theory does not focus
on the individual's response to social dynamics but instead looks to
informational influences as generating polarization. The fundamental
question it asks is: what is the number and persuasiveness of pro and con
151. These two hypotheses are not easily capable of empirical falsification. Isenberg, Group
Polarization, supra note 131, at 1143-44 (noting a number of attempts at determining which of the
hypotheses is valid, but concluding that the experiments have been largely inconclusive).
152. George R. Goethals & Mark P. Zanna, The Role of Social Comparison in Choice Shifts, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1469, 1476 (1979) (discussing studies on information sharing as
part of the risky shift); see also Jerald M. Jellison & John Riskind, A Social Comparison of Abilities
Interpretation of Risk-Taking Behavior, 15 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 375, 380-90 (1970)
(explaining a series of studies on the importance of social comparison of abilities in the risky shift);
Jerald M. Jellison & John Riskind, Attribution of Risk to Others as a Function of Their Ability, 20 J.
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 413, 415 (1971) (noting the attribution of riskiness to others as a
function of their ability); Jerald M. Jellison et al., Attribution ofAbility to Others on Skill and Chance
Tasks as a Function of Level of Risk, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 135, 139 (1972) (noting
the attribution of riskiness to others as a function of their ability, but applied to skill and chance tasks);
Isenberg, Group Polarization, supra note 131, at 1144.
153. PAT is a variant on the more general "informational processing" explanation for choice
shifts, but is now widely regarded as the best theory of informational influences. See Isenberg, Group
Polarization, supra note 131, at 1145.
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asks is: what is the number and persuasiveness of pro and con arguments
available to the group members? Thus, individuals come to predeliberation
decisions based on a limited set of arguments. During group deliberation
they are exposed to a larger pool of persuasive arguments, favoring the di-
rection of the group mean. Group members shift their opinions accord-
ingly.15 4
Sunstein is aware of the PAT and mentions it in Republic.com (pp. 67-
68). But like his discussion of the SCT, his account of the PAT ignores
features that cast doubt upon his conclusions. For example, PAT accounts
in part for the influence that a lone holdout can have upon a group. The
example that is often used is Henry Fonda's character in the movie Twelve
Angry Men.' There, Henry Fonda played a person who was, initially, the
single juror who believed a defendant to be not guilty of the murder with
which he was charged. Through a series of persuasive arguments generated
in the course of the movie, he convinced all the other jurors to reverse their
positions, from guilty to not guilty. As this example demonstrates, not all
group deliberations lead to "extreme" positions in the sense that Sunstein
uses it (that is, "extreme" equals "wrong"). Further, applying the PAT,
there are circumstances where group deliberation does not lead to further
polarization. This typically occurs where the arguments are well known,
and any amount of discussion does not lead to changes in the views of the
group members because they have heard it all before.56
Sunstein is not necessarily wrong, but the research he relies on does
not inevitably point to the conclusions he reaches. The issue is much more
complex than he makes it out to be. In short, he extrapolates too far. The
next section takes up that subject.
154. Eugene Bumstein & Amiram Vinokur, What a Person Thinks upon Learning He Has Chosen
Differently from Others: Nice Evidence for the Persuasive-Arguments Explanation of Choice Shifts, 11
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 412, 422-24 (1975) (discussing shifts in choice upon knowledge of
others' preferences, independent of discussion); Eugene Bumstein & Amiram Vinokur, Persuasive
Argumentation and Social Comparison as Determinants of Attitude Polarization, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 315, 320 (1977) (providing a defense of persuasive argument theory by itself as
sufficient for polarization); Eugene Bumstein et al., Interpersonal Comparison Versus Persuasive
Argumentation: A More Direct Test ofAlternative Explanations for Group-Induced Shifts in Individual
Choice, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 236, 240-45 (1973) (discussing evidence of shift on the
basis of number of persuasive arguments); Amiram Vinokur & Eugene Bumstein, Effects of Partially
Shared Persuasive Arguments on Group-Induced Shifts: A Group-Problem-Solving Approach, 29 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 305, 310-15 (1974) (noting evidence of polarization as a result of
information influence); Vinokur & Burnstein, Depolarization, supra note 136, 884-85 (noting evidence
of PAT alone is sufficient for group polarization); George D. Bishop & David G. Myers, Informational
Influence in Group Discussion, 12 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 92, 100 (1974)
(discussing evidence of informational influences being sufficient of themselves to generate
polarization); Daniel B. Madsden, Issue Importance and Choice Shifts: A Persuasive Arguments
Approach, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1118, 1125-27 (1978) (discussing evidence of PAT
confirmed in direction, strength, and magnitude of shift).
155. See BROWN, supra note 125, at 226-39.
156. Id. at225-26.
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B. Extrapolations in Social Psychology
Social Psychologist Stanley Milgram demonstrated that good people
will do terrible things when obeying a malevolent authority. 157 His research
teaches us a great deal about human nature, but it also demonstrates the
danger of extrapolating from the results of social psychology experiments.
In Milgram's famous social psychology experiments, he took ordinary
people and placed them in an extraordinary situation. Subjects became
"assistants" to a "scientist" in an experiment purportedly about the effect of
shock stimuli on learning. 158 His researcher strapped a "student" into an
apparatus that could deliver electric shocks, and then gave the subject con-
trol over the apparatus.159 When the learning exercise commenced, when-
ever the student got an answer wrong, which was distressingly often, the
scientist instructed the assistant to shock the student. 6 The shocks began
at a mild fifteen volts, and increased in severity in fifteen-volt increments
each time the student got an answer wrong. The levels of shock were
marked on the apparatus as starting in the safe range, but they moved
quickly into the serious, very dangerous, and potentially lethal range. 6'
Upon the initial shock, the student strapped into the apparatus indicated
surprise, and then as the shocks became worse he cried out, withdrew con-
sent from the experiment, pled to be released, screamed, and was eventu-
ally silent.62 The assistants administering the shocks were, of course,
troubled by what was happening, but were reassured by the scientist that it
was necessary to take this study to its conclusion in order to come to
understand the effect of shock on learning.'63 Even though the students
were screaming and pleading to be released, the scientist urged the assis-
tants to continue, and most did.164
In the duplicitous manner of social psychology, the experiment had
nothing to do with learning under stress and everything to do with investi-
gating obedience to authority. 165 Unbeknownst to the subjects, the
"scientist" and the "student" were in cahoots. The student never received
any shock at all, and simply followed a script pretending to be increasingly
hurt by the imaginary shocks administered. 66 The real question was at
what point between fifteen volts and four hundred fifty volts would people
refuse to go along with the authority figure and stop administering
157. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERMINENTAL VIEW 13-26 (1st ed.
1974).
158. Id. at 13-19.
159. Id. at 19-20.
160. Id. at20-21.
161. Id. at20.
162. Id. at 22-23.
163. Id. at21-23.
164. Id. at 22-23.
165. See id. at 13-16.
166. Id. at 13-15.
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shocks.'67 The anticipated rebellion point was when the victim begged to be
released-around one hundred forty volts.'68 The results were other-
wise: 63% of subjects obeyed the authority figure to the maximum, and
potentially lethal, four hundred fifty volts; and the average point of disobe-
dience was three hundred sixty volts. 16 9
The research leads to the rather unpalatable conclusion that most peo-
ple will obey authority figures, even to the point of hurting, maiming, or
potentially killing another person. This seems like a simple, albeit horrible,
result and one that we could assume would apply in other situations. We
might extrapolate from this and suggest that we would see the same result
in other types of authority situations. We might even suggest that we would
find this occurring on the Internet. But this type of extrapolation is very
dangerous and often wrong.
While Milgram's results were true within the specific context of the
experiments, they do not apply in other situations. A different experiment
by Gamson and others posing as the fictitious "Manufacturer's Human
Relations Consultants" ("MHRC") examined obedience to malevolent
authority in a slightly different manner. 7 ' Researchers placed participants
in a small team and told them that they were acting as a focus group for an
oil company engaged in a wrongful dismissal action brought by an
employee. Researchers gave them the facts of the case, which involved a
franchisee of a gas station who was terminated from his franchise because
he was living with a woman who was not his wife. They asked the partici-
pants to present arguments in favor of the company, to pretend to be
offended by the gas station franchisee's behavior, and to argue that he
should lose his franchise. 7 ' They videotaped the participants doing this. It
quickly became clear to the participants that the "company" was using
them to manufacture evidence against the franchisee, and this realization
was reinforced when researchers asked them to swear affidavits and pro-
vide releases for the "company" to use the videotapes in court. 72 The
MHRC participants responded differently than Milgram's participants.
Almost immediately there was significant rebellion.'73 At times violence
threatened to break out. The responses were so powerful that the
167. Id. at 27-31.
168. Stanley Milgram, Ethical Issues in the Study of Disobedience, in STANLEY MILORAM, THE
INDIVIDUAL IN A SOCIAL WORLD 139-46 (1977) [hereinafter MILGRAM, SOCIAL WORLD].
169. The results of Milgram's experiments have been replicated in a vast number of experiments
in many countries, showing a remarkable absence of sensitivity to country or culture. For a review of
the literature, see BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 125, at 3-10.
170. WILLIAM A. GAMSON ET AL., ENCOUNTERS WITH UNJUST AUTHORITY 3-11 (1982); see also
Stanley Milgram, Liberating Effects of Group Pressure, in MILGRAM, SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 168,
at 139-46.
171. GAMSON, supra note 170, at 4.
172. Id. at 3, 6.
173. Id, at 10.
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researchers called off the experiments before they were half completed in
the interests of the safety of the participants. 174
The crucial point here is not to examine the similarities and differ-
ences between the studies and determine what factors lead to obedience to
unjust authority and what factors lead to rebellion. 175 Rather, it is that rely-
ing upon Milgram's findings about obedience to authority gives us exactly
the wrong conclusion when certain features of the experiment are changed.
The conclusions about Milgram's experiment are limited to the circum-
stances surrounding that experiment. Extrapolating to a wholly different
environment, such as the one found in the MHRC experiment, leads to pre-
dictions of behavior that are the exact opposite of what is actually observed
in experiments.
Similar concerns arise regarding Sunstein's extrapolation from the
group polarization work to cyberspace. Apart from the complications iden-
tified above,176 Sunstein assumes that exactly the same group environment
exists in cyberspace as that found in the experimental settings that pro-
duced group polarization. The truth is that no empirical work has estab-
lished that group polarization exists within cyberspace settings. In fact, the
opposite is true. Recent studies have shown that Internet users are more
tolerant of diverse viewpoints than those who do not use the Internet.177
These studies did not control for the sort of filtering that concerns Sunstein,
so they are anything but conclusive. However, they provide some empirical
evidence against Sunstein's argument, whereas he gives us none in his
favor.
In fact, the absence of empirical evidence supporting Sunstein's
argument is more dangerous than it first appears. For three years we have
known the basic elements of Sunstein's argument. It is really just a popu-
larization of arguments that were presented earlier by psychologist Patricia
174. BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 125, at 14.
175. Brown suggests that the salient differences leading to the different outcomes include the dates
of the studies (Milgram took place in 1963; MHRC took place in 1981), the authority of the institutions
(Milgram took place at Yale University; MHRC took place at a market research company), and, most
important of all, the effect of collective action (Milgram tested individuals; MHRC tested a group). See
id. at 15-18.
176. See supra Part UII.A.
177. The 2000 General Social Survey, conducted by the University of Chicago's National Opinion
Research Center, found statistically significant differences in tolerance between those who use the
Interet often and those who do not. Of those who use the Interet more than ten hours per week, 82%
would permit their local library to access a book on communism. Of those who use the Internet less
than this, 56% would permit this. Furthermore, 71% of the heavy Internet users would allow racists to
conduct meetings, as against 56% of nonheavy Internet users. See Jeffrey R. Young, A Study Finds
That Web Users Are More Tolerant than Non-Users, Chron. of Higher Educ. Online, June 15, 2001,
available at http:llchronicle.comlfree/2001/06/2001061501t.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2001). Further,
the vast Pew Internet and American Life Project study on online communities concludes that there is a
vibrant connection between Internet usage and engagement in local and far-flung communities. Pew
Internet & American Life, at http://www.pewintemet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=47.
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Wallace,178 and which were taken up at about the same time by Andrew
Shapiro, a lawyer and policy analyst."' In 1999, Shapiro argued that per-
fect filtering would lead to a fraying of social ties, though he did not iden-
tify group polarization as the cause of this.I8 ° At the same time, Wallace
identified group polarization as leading to issues with online communica-
tions as a result of fragmentation of media environments.' While the
argument has been around for a while, we have yet to see a rise in extrem-
ism in that time. We have yet to see any empirical research validating his
claim that group polarization maps onto the Internet, but we are starting to
see empirical research that negates his argument.
We will probably never see the sorts of problems that he prophesies,
and we definitely should wait until appropriate evidence emerges that
group polarization is a problem in cyberspace before making such disturb-
ing claims. It is dangerous and irresponsible to use the kind of scare tactics
that Sunstein uses, when there is absolutely no evidence of the fears that he
creates. In short, his book is a very good example of an influential pundit
seeking to create an informational cascade toward a particular conclusion.
Which leads on to the subject of the next section.
C. Cyber-Gossip and Information Cascades
In addition to its fear of groups, Republic.com expresses a concern
about a particular form of online gossip. Sunstein worries that information
cascades occurring online create "cybercascades" of disinformation
(pp. 80-84). There is something intuitively right about one aspect of his
observation. The Net provides people with vastly greater access to infor-
mation at unparalleled speed. Moreover, unlike other media sources, the
Net thrives on nonauthoritative sources and unmediated, unedited informa-
tion, whether this be Matt Drudge's online scuttlebutt, weblogs, email dis-
cussion lists, Usenet newsgroups, or any other form of cyberspace data.
Because information that may be wrong bounces around cyberspace at
extraordinary speeds, we are likely to see the kinds of cybercascades that
Sunstein foretells.
Though these cascades may occur, their effect is far from clear.
Republic.corn lumps this problem together with group polarization and
178. PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 73-87 (1999).
179. See SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18. Some aspects of these observations
were made as early as 1997. See Marshall van Alstyne & Erik Brynjolfsson, Electronic
Communities: Global Village or Cyberbalkans? (1996), available at http:llweb.mit.edu/marshalV
www/Abstracts.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
180. SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 105-23. He called it "total filtering"
rather than "perfect filtering." Id. at 105-14.
181. WALLACE, supra note 178, at 73-87 (noting group polarization was one of a host of other
psychological issues like the robbers' cave problem, intergroup conflict, and so on.). She was less
pessimistic about the dangers faced since she recognized some of the limitations on the psychological
literature and seemed less keen on extrapolating from the literature. Id. at 78-80.
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concludes that social fragmentation will result. However, Sunstein seems
justifiably hesitant in ascribing earth-shaking dangers to cybercascades.
Though he indicates that cybercascades will become more problematic, the
strongest claim he makes against them is that they will cause "thousands or
even millions of people... [to] believe something that is quite false"
(p. 84). His concern seems to be that cybercascades will exacerbate the
dangers of online group polarization, not that they are nightmares in and of
themselves (p. 84).
Though Sunstein's other academic writings on informational and
reputational cascades have merit, the same cannot be said of Republic.com.
For example, in his other work, Sunstein and his coauthor, Timur Kuran,
focus on how cascades lead to errors in regulation.Y8 Here, a concern with
cascades has intellectual purchase, for if we are concerned about the effi-
cient allocation of regulatory resources, then it is a mistake to regulate
things that appear serious because of cascades of disinformation. We
should therefore consider how to limit these cascades. However, this
approach is not what Sunstein is talking about in Republic.com. Here he is
concerned about how cascades cause fragmentation in society (pp. 80-84),
and he does not establish that cascades will do this. Falsehoods, though
quickly propagated by the Internet, are typically remedied by contrary
information spreading as speedily through the same channels. And even if
this were not the case, Sunstein fails to establish that cybercascades lead to
any sort of social fragmentation at all. He provides no evidence that frag-
mentation is occurring from the existing informational cascades that he has
previously documented. His main concern here seems to be that cybercas-
cades increase group polarization. However, given the significant problems
with Sunstein's theory of online group polarization, 83 cybercascades add
little to the overall concern we might have about online communications.
With so little to fear either from groups or gossip, we must ask
whether it is appropriate to regulate speech and communications in the way
that Sunstein wishes. This type of question is one of political philosophy,
and leads us to an examination of a cyberlibertarian response to
Republic.com.
182. Kuran & Sunstein, Cascades, supra note 9, at 711-44.
183. See supra Part lI.A-B.
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IV
"WHAT CASS DOESN'T GET"'
184
But there is one common bulwark which the instinct of sensible
men possesses within itself, a good and safe one for all, but
invaluable for democracies against tyrants. And what is that
bulwark? It is mistrust. Guard that; hold fast to that. If you preserve
it, no harm can touch you. ["]What is your object?" I said.
"Freedom. Then do you not see that Philip's very titles are utterly
irreconcilable with that? For every king, every despot is the sworn
foe of freedom and of law. Beware," said I, "lest, seeking to be rid
of war, you find a master."
Demosthenes, Second Philippic5
Mistrust of rulers and a love of freedom are characteristics
Demosthenes and libertarians share.'86 This mistrust is, however, not an
aspect of Sunstein's political philosophy."7 In chapters four and five,
Sunstein preemptively defends the benefits of shared experience and social
cohesion against the charge that individual sovereignty and choice is fun-
damental to liberty. He argues that a communications policy limiting
choice is not necessarily an attack on fundamental freedoms. It depends on
how you view freedom, he says-is liberty merely consumer sovereignty
or is it more than this (pp. 89-124)?18
This sort of talk is a red-rag-to-a-bull for libertarians. The only way to
enrage them more would be to argue that too much freedom is a bad thing,
which is precisely what Sunstein does when he insists that "[a] system of
limitless individual choices, with respect to communications, is not
184. It seems there is now a convention within debates on cyberspace regulation that any attack by
a liberal on a libertarian, or vice versa, will be entitled "What X Doesn't Get." This can be traced back
to a debate between the liberal Lawrence Lessig and the libertarian Declan McCullagh, where Lessig
entitled a chapter of his book, "What Declan Doesn't Get." LaSSIG, CODE, supra note 17, at 231-34
(arguing that a decentralized mechanism of Internet governance was dangerous and simplistic). So,
when libertarian David Post sought to criticize Lessig, he called his article, "What Larry Doesn't Get."
Post, Larry, supra note 60, at 1439 (suggesting that, contrary to Lessig's approach, code regulation
might appropriately be undertaken as a decentralized, bottom-up process). It seems that the convention
now extends to any criticism within cyberlaw, even those where a liberal criticizes a liberal. See, e.g.,
Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy: (What Larry Doesn't
Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1 (2001) (criticizing Lessig's conception of the effectiveness of
privacy regulation).
185. DEMOSTHENES, Second Philippic, supra note 6, paras. 24-25.
186. In truth, of course, Demosthenes was not distrustful of governments. He was a senator and
head of the democratic faction. Encyclopedia Britannica, supra note 3. He was railing against Philip, so
any argument that might sway his audience was useful ammunition.
187. Nor is it an aspect of mine. I am not a libertarian, "cyber" or otherwise. I therefore do not
wish to pass myself off as one, and only take up some features of the cyber-liberal challenge thrown
down by Sunstein in chapters four and five of Republic.com.
188. See supra Part I.D (summarizing his argument).
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necessarily in the interest of citizenship .... " (p. 123). Cyberlibertarians
have already taken issue with this.189
In this Part, I discuss two challenges to Sunstein's conception of
online democracy. The first is the obvious concern that cyberlibertarians
have with his approach. The second is the less obvious, but no less impor-
tant, challenge to deliberative democracy recently mounted by figures such
as Edward Rubin."0
A. Paternalism and Cyberliberties
Cyberlibertarianism reveals two particular problems with Sunstein's
reform proposals. First, in arguing against consumer empowerment and in
favor of a reduction in choice (pp. 113-23), Sunstein seeks to protect us
against ourselves. Reared on rugged individualism and the invocation of
personal liberties, an American audience is unlikely to appreciate this
paternalism. Liberal democratic theory, and cyberspace liberal democratic
theory, is on its safest ground when it seeks to protect individuals from
majoritarian excesses. 1 ' However, Sunstein is not suggesting that govern-
ment act within this safe realm. Rather, he implies that individuals cannot
be trusted with their own media choices. "You want to watch baseball?
Tough. It's not in your best interest. You can watch PBS, where we have a
fascinating program on the geopolitical basis for the Middle East dispute.
Don't complain! You'll be better off." This is of course an exaggeration,
and Sunstein's argument is much more subtle. But it is hard to come away
from this part of the book without the feeling that somehow you have done
something wrong by watching Oprah, or Buffi the Vampire Slayer, instead
of a worthy PBS documentary entitled "Canada: Our Good Neighbor of
the North." This guilty feeling is unlikely to sit well with the American
public, who naturally eschews such paternalism. The sheer unpopularity of
such regulation makes it inconceivable.
189. See, e.g., Matthew Gaylor, Slashdot, Apr. 5, 2001, at http://slashdot.org/books/
0l1/03125/1617212.shtml (last visited Aug. 29, 2001). The final paragraph of his review summarizes the
view:
The celebrated civil libertarian, John Stuart Mill, contended that enlightened judgment is
possible only if one considers all facts and ideas, from whatever source, and tests one's own
conclusions against opposing views. Therefore, all points of view-even those that are "bad"
or socially harmful-should be represented in the "marketplace of ideas." And the Internet is
an incredibly free and eclectic smorgasbord of ideas. And just as we have freedom to choose
which sites we visit or what print magazines or books we read, it would be the end of
freedom as we know it if the government forced us to read or watch what they want, even if it
were only a link. Thanks, but no thanks to Republic.Com.
Id. Sunstein can dispatch this argument by noting that Gaylor unintentionally restates the fundamental
fear of Republic.com: perfect filtering removes alternate points of view, which is a terrible thing. So
should not a dyed-in-the-wool cyberlibertarian drop his arms and join with the cyberliberal to defend
against this terrible outcome?
190. Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (2001).
191. See Netanel, Cyberspace Self Governance, supra note 19, at 421-27, 444-46.
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The second feature of the cyberlibertarian critique emerges from the
underlying justifications for its political philosophy. This is the pragmatic
observation, first expressed by Johnson and Post,'92 that cyberspace chal-
lenges the nation-state as the presumptively legitimate regulatory sover-
eign. The relevant inquiry here involves determining precisely which
national government should have the right to regulate activities in cyber-
space, given that activities in cyberspace are not tied to geographical bor-
ders and easily slip between them. Sunstein's book, like many of the
second generation before him,193 assumes that American political and legal
philosophy can be applied to cyberspace, in the same way that we regulate
TV networks (pp. 172-80).
When Sunstein talks of decision making by "us" and of making
choices collectively, he is not talking about the Italian goatherd, the
Singaporean banker, or the South African fisherman. Rather, he is talking
to, for, and about the Beltway insider who has the ear of U.S.
Representatives and Senators in Washington, D.C. His is a very "second-
generation" view of the world that assumes the peculiarly American con-
ception that rights-based analysis must have universal application to cyber-
space. This approach blithely ignores legal philosophies and systems based
on Shyaria (Muslim) law, Confucianism, or other non-Western systems.
And even within Western countries, the American emphasis on rights-
based discourse is often seen as irrelevant to the majority of legal systems
that are not based on a Bill of Rights or even a written constitution.
Sunstein may seek to rely on Jack Goldsmith's response to the con-
cerns raised by Johnson and Post. 94 Goldsmith posits a pragmatic reliance
on private international law, suggesting that the nation-state is both able
and justified in regulating activities that occur within its borders, whether
that happens online or offline.195 Cyberspace is only separate from physical
space in the abstract. There is always someone sitting in front of a com-
puter whom the state can collar if he or she transgresses the law.196 The
general problem with this response is that it answers the concern that a
192. See Johnson & Post, Borders, supra note 60, at 1370-76.
193. David Post's review of Lessig's Code, supra note 17, unsurprisingly makes a similar point
See Post, Larry, supra note 60, at 1455-56.
194. There are a number of other responses to other parts of the Johnson and Post thesis. See, e.g.,
Netanel, Self-Governance, supra note 19, at 421-46 (arguing against the normative component of
Johnson and Post, where they argue that cyberspace can generate democratic perfection). Netanel
shows that cyberspace self-governance, and specifically online direct democracy, causes significant
problems from the perspective of democratic theory. See id. This is not important to Sunstein's work,
except in the sense that both Sunstein and Netanel are dealing with concerns about cyberspace
democracy.
195. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1203-30
(1998); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 475-80 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet: Three
Persistent Fallacies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1119, 1125-26 (1998).
196. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 195, at 1200-02.
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party in cyberspace is beyond the reach of any law, but it does not handle
the problem that the same party is subject to every law of every state. 97
Goldsmith's response is helpful to Sunstein's position in that it is
descriptively plausible for the United States to regulate as Sunstein sug-
gests. 19 But it does not address the question of whether Sunstein's media
labeling requirements will apply to French, Australian, and Malaysian
sites. Since media content is the most mobile of cyberspace ventures, 99 we
are already seeing regulatory arbitrage occurring for media. The United
States now has the dubious distinction of hosting most if not all of the
German neo-Nazi sites, which are written in German, by Germans, for
Germans. Hosting this material is illegal in Germany, but protected speech
in the United States."0 Sunstein may perhaps say, "That's exactly what I'm
suggesting we need to regulate!" In that case, what is he to make of the
world's largest child pornography sites that operate out of Russia and
Indonesia, but have a large U.S. subscriber base?2 . The Indonesian
authorities have promised to crack down on these rings, but are somewhat
hampered by the problem that online kiddie porn is not illegal in
Indonesia. 2 Sunstein may dismiss this as a trivial implementation prob-
lem, but it is anything but trivial. Content is incredibly mobile, and
Sunstein does not even stop to consider how regulatory arbitrage affects his
argument.2 3
197. We might call this the "Yahoo! problem" after the arguably extraterritorial application of
French law on the U.S. portal. The Tribunaux de Grand Instance held that the American company
Yahoo! was liable under French anti-Nazi laws, on the basis that French citizens could view Yahoo!
Auctions of Nazi and neo-Nazi materials. See Union Des Etudiants Juits de France/Ligue Contre le
Racisme et L'Antisemitisme-LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc.fYahoo France, Tribunaux de Grand Instance
(Gomez J.), Paris, May 22, 2000 [unpublished], goRG: 00/05308; see also Michael Geist, Is There a
There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 661 PRACTICING L. INST./PAT 561
(2001), available at 16 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1345 (2001); Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global
Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 943, 961-72 (1998) (predicting that by providing virtual
hosting, the Internet will affect regulation in nation states to offer more desirable hosting locations).
198. The specific regulatory proposals are explained and critiqued in the next section. See infra
Part V.
199. Unlike, say, transactional e-commerce systems that require local, physical infrastructure,
online content can be hosted anywhere without affecting the consumer's enjoyment or usage.
200. See, e.g., Ned Stafford, U.S. Web Hosts Close Neo-Nazi Sites at German Urging,
NEWSBYTES, Aug. 30, 2001, available at http:lwww.newsbytes.comlnews/01/169588.html (last visited
Jan. 23, 2002).
201. See Futile Quest for Kid Porn Traders, WIRD NEws ONLINE, Aug. 9, 2001, available at
http:llwww.wired.cornlnews/politics/0,1283,45965,00.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2001).
202. Id.
203. Polk Wagner reminded me that it is possible for a nation-state to avoid the regulatory
arbitrage dilemma by mandating content controls on backbone providers or on Internet service
providers. While this is, of course, correct, it has two problems within the particular context of
Sunstein's suggestions. First, these sorts of controls are likely to be reasonably effective when targeted
at a range of objectionable content, the paradigmatic example being kiddie por. They are unlikely to
be effective when, as here, the controls extend to virtually any site, and where significant editorial
expertise is necessary to meet the requirements of the controls. It is easy to identify and control kiddie
por. It is much harder to identify which sites fit Sunstein's criteria and what is an effective
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Sunstein's is a peculiarly America-centered view of the Internet,
replete with U.S. policy arguments, rights-based analysis, a concern with
applying the Bill of Rights in cyberspace, and the assumption that we, that
is, Americans, can regulate content effectively without worrying about
regulatory arbitrage. America is a big place, but it does not contain the
majority of the world's populace. Cyberlibertarians justifiably disagree
with the assumption that nation-states map cleanly to cyberspace.
B. The Historicist Critique
One of the unstated premises of Republic.com is that Sunstein's vision
of the democratic process is the best, or most plausible, account available.
His account relies on recent "deliberative democracy" theory, in common
with notables such as Ackerman, Rawls, and others,2" and which he has
articulated elsewhere.2" 5 This theory's central claim is that democracy is
defined by the existence of a "free, inclusive, rational debate by citizens
that determines the basic thrust of public policy."0 6 On this view, democ-
racy therefore requires an open exchange of views and informed debate so
that political and social consensus can emerge.2"7
Republic.com is not intended to be a serious analysis of democracy,
though it is dependent on the deliberative democratic account (pp. 37-
39),208 and Sunstein has suggested that his intention in the book was to "get
countervoice. Second, even if this sort of regulation were possible, all that it means is that U.S. content
providers (who would now be forced out of the United States) would be free to provide information to
all the world free of Sunsteinean restrictions. U.S. backbone providers would block the content,
meaning that U.S. citizens could not see this material. But this simply leads to reduced information for
Americans and no measurable effect on the content providers who now reside beyond U.S.
jurisdictional reach.
204. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); JOSEPH M.
BEssETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT (1994); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND POLITICAL
SCIENCE (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC
REFORM (1991); JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
(1995); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); Joshua Cohen,
Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND
POLITICS 67 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
205. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
206. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, supra note 190, at 747.
207. Id. at 747-48.
208. See, e.g., "This form of republicanism [of the Constitutional Founders] involved an attempt to
create a 'deliberative democracy"' (p. 38). "In this system, representatives would be accountable to the
public at large. But there was also supposed to be a large degree of reflection and debate, both within
the citizenry and within government itself' (p. 38) (citation omitted). "The aspiration to deliberative
democracy can be seen in many places in the constitutional design" (p. 38).
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hold of some neglected prerequisites of democratic self-government."2 9 It
is not therefore hard to see the importance of deliberative democracy to
Republic.com's specific thesis that we need more and better forms of
Internet communication so that our democracy is meaningful. The fear of
group polarization and fragmentation of the communications infrastructure
poses a huge danger for anyone committed to deliberation as the core of
democratic engagement.
This Review is hardly the place to mount a concerted campaign
against deliberative democracy. However, the recent development of his-
toricist-microanalytical arguments against Sunstein's deliberative democ-
racy ideal do challenge the central political conception that Sunstein
proposes. As a result, it is instructive to examine why Sunstein's political
theory may not be an acceptable account of our government and political
process, and see how the historicist critique of deliberative democracy
affects the claims in Republic.com.
The historicist attack on this conception of democracy is best articu-
lated by Edward Rubin.2"' Rubin notes that the term "democracy" is an
"essentially contested concept 2 1 that has a series of embedded implica-
tions about the ideal role of the citizen in public life, the nature of govern-
ment's interaction with the people, the requirements of deliberation within
society, and so forth.2" These implications are drawn both from initial
meanings of the term,2 3 as well as the usage of the term by political theo-
rists who had particular agendas for adopting the term and who grafted
meaning onto the word.2 4 Rubin demonstrates that the term is a dangerous
one, because the embedded implications give rise to a series of arguments
against the nature of modem politics and the rise of the administrative
state. 15 The obvious example is the extended attack on judicial review by
the Legal Process School.216 This school of thought characterized judicial
review, specifically the role of the Supreme Court during its opposition to
209. Cass Sunstein, Afterword to REPUBLIC.COM (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Afterword].
210. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, supra note 190, at 747-55.
211. WILLIAMa E. CONNOLLY, THE TERIS OF POLITICAL DISCOURsE 10 (3d ed. 1993).
212. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, supra note 190, at 715-55.
213. Id. at 715-25
214. Id. at 725-55.
215. Id. at 711-15.
216. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16, 19 (1962) (suggesting that the electoral process is the supreme
embodiment of democracy and that judicial review undermines this process); JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 10 (1980) (characterizing judicial review as contrary to majority rule
and contrary to the fundamental principle of democracy); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 4-5 (1980) (arguing that the unelected and politically
nonresponsible judiciary should not be free to stop the elected representatives from governing as they
like).
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 90 Cal. L. Rev. 659 2002
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
the New Deal legislation, as "antidemocratic." Subsequently, the same
charges have been leveled at the administrative state, with its reliance on a
nonelected bureaucracy." 7 Rubin argues that this focus on the concept of
democracy is dangerous, because it distorts the account of the way that
modem governments relate to their citizens.2 8 He recommends that we
bracket the term, and instead undertake a careful description of the way
that governments operate.219 Only in this way can we meaningfully decide
whether our government actually meets the political commitments that we
actually consider important.22 These political commitments-securing lib-
erty, avoiding oppression, reducing civil strife, and so on-are meaningful
in a way that the loaded term "democracy" is not.
This approach poses serious difficulties for Sunstein's assumption that
democracy is the primary value in the modem political process. Moreover,
Rubin's critique of democracy includes a withering attack on deliberative
democratic theory, and presents two problems with the general theory that
also infect Republic.com. 22' First is Rubin's observation about the nature of
deliberation in a modem society. Deliberation assumes an intensive inter-
change of ideas in a context where the speakers are in direct contact and
can accept or reject the other's arguments. 22 With a small number of peo-
ple involved, such as in the ancient Greek assembly,2 23 the concept of de-
liberation within the political process is an accurate description. In the
modem state with hundreds of institutional agencies, and where citizens
are engaged with these agencies rather than each other, the notion of delib-
eration is empirically implausible.2 4 Under these conditions, "deliberation"
is not an accurate description; it is a metaphor. And it is a metaphor that
masks the reality of the political process: "the cost of indulging in this
217. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, supra note 190, at 711-13.
218. Id. at 711-15, 755.
219. Id. at 711-15, 755-69
220. Id. at 755, 770-92.
221. Id. at 749-54. The two problems identified here are with the position of deliberative
democracy as a descriptive theory of modem political systems. There is another problem which Rubin
identifies with deliberative democracy as a normative theory. Id. at 754-55. Because Republic.com is
not a defense of deliberative democracy in normative terms, and is about the pragmatic reality of
Internet communications and its role in the political process, I need only focus on the descriptive
difficulties with deliberative democracy.
222. Id. at 749.
223. Id. (citation omitted) ("The metaphor of deliberation among the members of civil society in
general seems inspired by an ancient Greek assembly, where all the citizens meet to debate and decide
'all causes, or at any rate.., the most important."').
224. Id. Rubin commented:
In a modem state, particularly an administrative state with its hundreds of operational
agencies, citizens and citizen groups are more likely to be engaged in intensive interactions
with a particular agency than they are with each other. Bankers, factory managers, and
large-scale farmers do not interact with members of the other groups very much, but they may
talk to their own regulatory agencies more often than they talk to anyone outside their
immediate families and colleagues.
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enticing metaphor.., is that one underemphasizes or ignores the more
subtle gradations of contemporary politics."2' The relevance of this obser-
vation to Republic.com is hard to overstate. Sunstein's worry over the ef-
fects of group polarization and cybercascades is a worry that deliberation
cannot operate as idealized in the deliberative democratic account. His de-
light at the somewhat artificial results of the deliberative polls of Fishkin 226
is a delight at the centerpiece of deliberative democracy being demon-
strated. However, both the worry and delight evaporate if, as Rubin sug-
gests, these features of deliberation are simply not found in the modem
state. If deliberation is not central to our political process, then there is lit-
tle to fear even if we accept Sunstein's charge that the Internet reduces de-
liberation.
The second problem is deliberative democracy's assumption that the
deliberation must be rational.227 This particular assumption is at the core of
Republic.com's concern with effects on people's thoughts, most notably
group polarization and informational cybercascades, which lead to irra-
tional deliberation. As Rubin demonstrates, contemporary political and
social debate are characterized by widespread irrationality." Within our
political process, appeals to emotion or personal interest are the norm.
Measured, reflective analysis of the merits and demerits of the argument
are atypical. Unlike Sunstein,229 Rubin does not decry this as a failing of
our polity. Instead he suggests that it is a feature of our modem political
system." People's lives are affected by politics: their salary is reduced or
increased by political choices, their liberty is threatened, their children's
opportunity is reduced or improved, and so on. We should not be surprised
that the modem arena of political debate is shot through with emotional-
ism, and calls for rational deliberation within our democracy are likely to
lead nowhere." If this is so, then we should not be troubled even if we
accept Sunstein's argument that the Internet creates cybercascades of disin-
formation that appeal to people's emotional, rather than rational, side.
Equally we need not be too concerned if group polarization equally plays
to this side of our nature. Our modem state will not fall apart if emotions
225. Id.
226. See infra Part V; FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 204, at 200-07; James F.
Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue, in THE POLL WITH A
HUMAN FACE 23 (Maxwell McCombs & May Reynolds eds., 1999).
227. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, supra note 190, at 750.
228. Id. ("Contemporary political debate obviously fails to achieve this standard, something one
can readily confirm by spending a few minutes listening to political talk radio.").
229. Republic.com can be seen as an attempt to explain how certain irrational communication
features of the Internet pose problems for democracy.
230. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, supra note 190, at 751.
231. Rubin explains that this is not a concern because the political process does manage to serve
our needs perfectly well. See id. at 751-53. Focusing on the requirement of rational deliberation is to
focus on the wrong thing.
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are tweaked. Our modem state is already characterized by nonrational
argument.
Rubin's account is valuable here for a number of reasons. First, it
removes our fear that somehow the Intemet is fundamentally antidemo-
cratic. It allows us to recognize that tagging something as "undemocratic"
means little when the word "democratic" is not a good descriptor of the
modem political system with which we are currently quite happy. Even if
we accept Sunstein's implicit claim that the Net is a danger to our democ-
racy, little follows from it. Second, the specific challenges to deliberative
democracy have serious purchase in any analysis of Republic.com. These
challenges demonstrate that the fears of group polarization and cybercas-
cades, even if real, do not threaten our central political commitments.
V
FIFTY WAR GALLEYS AND HALF THE CAVALRY: SUNSTEIN'S PROPOSALS
FOR REFORM
First then, men of Athens, I propose to equip fifty war-galleys; next
you must make up your minds to embark and sail in them
yourselves, if necessary. Further I recommend the provision of
transports and other vessels, sufficient for the conveyance of half
our cavalry.
Demosthenes, First Philippic"3 '
Rather than fifty war-galleys and half a cavalry, Sunstein presents six
regulatory options to defeat the scourge that he has outlined. His first sug-
gestion is to set up website-cum-chatrooms called "deliberative domains"
(pp. 170-72). In these fora, users would share and debate issues of public
policy. The idea of deliberative discussion comes from the work of James
Fishkin, a political scientist. 33 Fishkin compared typical polling results and
compared them to "deliberative opinion polls" where the people were pro-
vided with issue papers, and given an opportunity to discuss the issues with
others from diverse backgrounds and air their concerns and questions.
Contrary to the typical group dynamic, these discussions tended to depolar-
ize the group.234 Sunstein suggests that a place in cyberspace set aside as a
"deliberative domain" would lead to the same desirable result (pp. 170-72).
His second proposal is that producers of potentially harmful communica-
tions must disclose the harm to the public (pp. 172-77). This proposal fol-
lows Justice Brandeis's famous dictum that "[s]unlight is said to be the
232. DEMOSTHENES, First Philippic, supra note 6, par. 16.
233. See FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 204, at 200-07; Fishkin & Luskin, Bring
Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue, supra note 226.
234. Sunstein discusses Fishkin's work in Republic.com (pp. 84-87), noting that deliberative
domains have been shown to depolarize groups, form discussions amongst participants, and lead to
tolerance and informed debate.
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best of disinfectants ... "235 His third proposal is that we institute a code of
conduct encouraging self-regulation by communications providers
(pp. 177-80). Fourth, he argues that we should provide government subsi-
dies to websites that encourage public debate (pp. 180-82). This is a sug-
gestion previously made by Andrew Shapiro, who argued in favor of a
space called PublicNet.26 Sunstein's fifth suggestion is to provide
"must-carry" rules for popular websites that forces them to include links to
sites that encourage debate over substantive questions of public interest
(pp. 182-89). Finally, his sixth proposal is that we provide "must-carry"
rules for particularly partisan websites, so that they too are forced to in-
clude links to sites that have opposing views (pp. 182-89).
With the possible exception of the first suggestion, all of these pro-
posals attempt to take regulatory mechanisms from broadcast media, espe-
cially television, and map them onto the Internet. Sunstein scarcely hides
this. The examples of success that he uses (pp. 172-84), from disclosure
laws through ratings schemas to "must-carry" rules, seem to be almost
exclusively drawn from his experience on a committee investigating public
interest requirements for broadcast media (pp. 147-59). 7 Though he
admits that it may be slightly harder to regulate the Internet than broadcast
television (p. 174),11 he never really recognizes that the Internet is so fun-
damentally different from broadcast media that none of his regulatory
strategies are likely to be successful. The problems may be usefully divided
into the general, which apply to all of his proposals, and the specific, which
apply to each proposal individually.
A. General Problems
The most serious problem with Sunstein's reforms is that they are all
inconsistent with his starting assumption. The very notion of perfect filter-
ing undercuts each one. Consider any one of the proposals listed above and
accept Sunstein's assumption of perfect filtering. Which one of these
reform proposals will be able to bypass the filtering and lead to Sunstein's
desired pluralistic public fora outcome? Surely any "perfect filtering"
mechanism worth the name would be able to extract any alternative view-
points that have been bolted on to websites, as a result of easily identifiable
disclosure laws or "must-carry" rules. This is one of the things that even
rudimentary filtering can do. If laws are put in place to force placement of
certain types of information on websites, on newsgroups, or in emails, then
235. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).
236. SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 205-06.
237. See also Sunstein, Television, supra note 9, at 508-09 (arguing in favor of public interest
obligations on television broadcasters).
238. He says, for example, of his disclosure proposal, that it "is obviously easier to impose
disclosure requirements on radio and television broadcasters, relatively few in number and publicly
licensed in any case, than on websites." (p. 174).
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modem-day, imperfect filtering technologies already can sift this out.239
None of his other suggestions-deliberative domains, government subsi-
dies, and industry self-regulations-appear capable of producing an envi-
ronment that would avoid the filtering that Sunstein fears.
One way Sunstein may respond to the above criticism is to add a new
regulation that mandates the removal of filtering against deliberative
domains or "must-carry" material. Unfortunately for Sunstein, this new
regulation would suffer from a second, fatal flaw: the regulatory responses
of a local broadcast environment do not map to the global cyberspace envi-
ronment. As discussed above,24 participants will engage in regulatory arbi-
trage and will virtually "move" to the regulatory environment that is most
congenial to the type of material that they disseminate. The level of content
regulation that Sunstein presents is surely sufficient to spur a wholesale
migration of content outside the regulatory ambit of the United States.24'
This problem, along with the fact that any reforms will be filtered out, is
fatal for any of the regulatory suggestions that Sunstein provides. There
are, however, a number of other obvious problems that plague each one of
his specific suggestions.
B. Specific Problems
His first suggestion that we establish deliberative domains is essen-
tially identical to his fourth suggestion of government sponsorship of a dis-
cussion area like Shapiro's PublicNet.242 Both suggestions are strange.
First, these sorts of discussion areas already exist.243 In chatrooms, in dis-
cussion groups, in newsgroups, and on websites, these "accept-all-comers"
discussions are occurring right now. His proposal seems to boil down to
the anodyne idea that "government could provide a funding mechanism to
subsidize the development of some such sites without having a managerial
role" (pp. 171-72). This argument fails to establish a pressing need to
239. It is trivially easy to filter material identified with a tag such as "Mandatory Government
Warning: This Website Causes Extremism."
240. See supra Part IV.
241. Clearly the more partisan sites like the ones at issue in his second and sixth proposal will
move (for example, the German neo-Nazi or Indonesian kiddie porn sites). See supra notes 200-02 and
accompanying text. It also seems likely that popular sites, those mentioned in the fifth proposal, will
weigh the costs and will find it easier to relocate than hire attorneys to vet every single page of their
content to conform with these new rules.
242. See SHAPIRO, CONTROL REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 205-06. The main difference is that,
under Shapiro's model, the government would mandate the inclusion of an icon for PublicNet on users'
desktops. See id.
243. Consider the discussion environment that the usenet newsgroups comprise. If you can
imagine a topic-sex, politics, IBM-computer-hating, dog-fancying, window dressing-then you will
find it here. Lest Sunstein argue that these are all narrowly focused, note that many of these discussions
are broadly conceived and provide for broadly divergent opinions. Sunstein recognizes this but
nonetheless presses on with the suggestion (p. 171), and with an obduracy that would be admirable if it
were not so wrong-headed.
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provide state funding for commercial operators to do exactly what they are
doing now. Perhaps there are some particularly worthy website operators
who have not been able to access the government trough sufficiently. We
could reward them with a hypothetical "deliberative-domain grant" so that
they can continue doing what they do now, and have their shareholders
enjoy the pleasure of artificially inflated returns as well as knowledge that
they are doing good.
The other strange aspect of this suggestion is that there is little to sug-
gest that this will depolarize groups and counter the extremism problem.
This is Cass as Kevin Costner: "If you build it, they will come."2' The sad
truth is that they will not come. They will not even know it exists. And
even if they did, the people about whom we should be concerned will filter
it out. We should be mindful of Singapore's efforts to encourage debate
and alternate views. The Singaporean government chose to create a
Speakers' Corner in a public park in downtown Singapore, modeled after
the famous place of the same name in London's Hyde Park.245 I walked
past this park every day for two weeks during a recent stay there, and I
never saw a single speaker.246
His second and third proposals would require Internet content provid-
ers causing harm to disclose this fact, and institute a self-regulatory regime
to somehow create and enforce industry Codes of Conduct (pp. 172-80).
Actually, this is not quite accurate as his second proposal is that broadcast
television and radio providers disclose their harmful programming and
provide details about their public service activities (pp. 174-75). Like his
second proposal, his third proposal is also not about the Net. Instead, he
suggests that television and radio providers follow a Code of Conduct. He
is so caught up in his Internet-as-broadcasting fallacy that he actually for-
gets about the Internet in these sections of the book. Instead, he provides
some guidelines to the FCC regarding what to do about bad television and
radio programming.247
To the extent that this response is about the Net at all, the Internet-as-
broadcasting fallacy hamstrings it. As an example of a useful regulatory
response, Sunstein trots out that tired, old workhorse, the V-chip (p. 173),
244. FIELD OF DREAmS (Universal Pictures 1989).
245. Ruth Youngblood, Speaker's Corner Anniversary Lures Government Critics, DEUTSCHE
P.ESSE-AGENTUR, August 29, 2001; Barry Porter, Economics Professor Gives Singapore Something to
Chev Over, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, March 31, 2000, at 12; Degrees of Freedom in Lion City,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, April 17, 1999, at 15.
246. David Post reminded me that the same observation can be made about "public access"
channels on cable. The degree to which the public makes use of this access is very slight indeed. See
Monroe Price & Charles Morris, Public Access Channels: The New York City Experience, in ON THE
CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 229 (1971).
247. Perhaps while the FCC is doing this, it might also institute a truth-in-writing requirement for
authors writing about the Internet: do not say that you are proposing regulatory responses for the Net
when you are really talking about reform of television networks.
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the chip that is required to be in every U.S. television above thirteen inches
in size that can be set to stop children viewing inappropriate material.248
Though the V-chip is an expensive part of the regulatory structure of U.S.
television programming, 49 it is rarely used by parents25 ' and typically is
not even mentioned in the manual of the TVs that contain it.211 Introducing
mandatory rating schemas and V-chip-like blocking systems to the Net
creates a host of new problems: Who does the rating? What rating schema
is used? Who mandates and enforces the rating of content? Does the rating
apply to everything on the Net, or just to websites, or newsgroups, or
chatrooms, or email content? Does it apply to foreign content that is view-
able in the United States (which is to say, all Net content)?
The same forgetfulness is evident in Sunstein's third proposal. He
waxes lyrical about the effect that Codes of Conduct might have on the
television and radio industry and forgets that the Net just might be a little
different (pp. 177-80). He suggests, for example, that industry members
(by which he means television networks) could "agree to cover substantive
issues in a serious way, to avoid sensationalistic treatment of politics, to
give extended coverage to public issues, and to allow diverse voices to be
heard" (p. 179). This just does not make any sense when applied to the Net.
Unlike television, one does not need to be a billionaire to disseminate
Internet content, so there is no need to create a Code of Conduct to ensure
diverse voices, or serious treatment of politics. There already exists a
hugely diverse online populace and a centralized "Internet Code of
Conduct" is not likely to make it more diverse. This apart, how are you
going to be able to draft an industry Code of Conduct to accommodate
every single person who publishes on the Net in some way? Recall that, for
example, posts to newsgroups or emails sent to discussion lists are often
archived. Does this mean that everyone who has ever emailed should have
a say in the Code of Conduct? Or is it only restricted to those whom
Sunstein worries about at night-portals with a large user base, and neo-
Nazi groups? Sunstein's failure to recognize the difference between the
Internet and other media confuses his reform proposals as much as his
248. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 303(x) (1991 & Supp. I 2000); see also
Andrea K. Rodgers, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. and Television Channel
Blocking Technology, 40 JURiMETRICS J. 499, 514 (2000) (explaining FCC regulation for V-chip
enabled television and transmission of rating schemas in television signals' vertical blanking interval).
249. J. M. Balkin, Comment, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast
Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1133-40, 1153-55 (1996) (discussing First Amendment issues with the
V-chip, including cost features).
250. SENATE COMM. ON SCI. & TRANSP., Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: A Review
of Self-Regulation and Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording, and Electronic
Game Industries, FED. NEws SERV., Sept. 13, 2000, at 119, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/
violencerpttest.htm (discussing Kaiser Foundation study concluding a majority of Americans do not use
the resources of the V-chip).
251. Id.
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original theory confuses the meaning of perfect filtering and group polari-
zation.
His final suggestions involve "must-carry" rules for partisan and
popular websites, requiring links to other sites that either encourage debate
in the political process in the case of popular sites, or disclose the other
side of the other argument in the case of partisan sites (pp. 182-89). Of all
of the proposals, these are, on one level, the least stupid. They are rela-
tively easy to implement. 2 But like the earlier suggestions, this one begins
looking a little foolish in the details: Who determines what website is the
opposite of the partisan sites? How is this enforced? Of course, of all of the
suggestions, these are the ones most affected by perfect filtering and regu-
latory arbitrage, and are the most likely to be circumvented.
In the end analysis, the most damaging problem to Sunstein's propos-
als is that he fails to indicate how his regulatory proposals will minimize
the damage that he asserts will result from group polarization on the
Internet. In fact, none of these suggestions appear likely to reduce group
polarization at all. If we look back at the theories of group polarization," 3
we see that polarization occurs where social standing is at stake,254 or
where a group member presents persuasive arguments toward one side.255
Does Sunstein really believe that putting a link at the bottom of a page is
going to fulfill either of these prerequisites? Perhaps I am the only person
who reads a page of material on the web and does not bother to click on the
links at the bottom of the page. But even if the links are accessed, how is
this going to influence the group dynamic at the heart of the risky shift?
Even if we have these expensive government-run PublicNets, where is the
evidence that this will stop the rise in extremism? Republic.com simply
fails to convince us that standard media regulation mechanisms will be
remotely useful in combating Sunstein's Internet fears.
VI
BOOK OF THE YEAR
In one sense Republic.com is the Book of the Year. It is just that the
year is circa 1954. At the heart of Republic.com lies not so much a fear of
the Internet as a fear of broadcast television and radio. Perhaps we can
chalk this up to Sunstein's time spent as a member of the Presidential
Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television
252. These proposals are so easy to implement that Sunstein himself placed links in the Princeton
University Press website publicizing Republic.com, citing other legal theorists who disagree with him,
after Matthew Gaylor pointed out that he had failed to heed his own counsel. See Gaylor, supra note
189; see also Urusual Bollini's Welcome Message, Princeton University Press website, at
http://pup.princeton.edulsunstein/sun-foum.txt (last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
253. See supra Part IL.
254. See supra Part fl.A.l.
255. See supra Part IILA.2.
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Broadcasters, and the battles he fought against the National Association of
Broadcasters (pp. 147-50).256 Though Sunstein claims that this is a book
about the new medium of the Internet, he in fact seems more interested in
newspapers (pp. 13, 61, 130-31, 138-39, 145), television (pp. 35-6, 114,
172-77, 92-93, 144-46, 182, 127-30, 147-50, 154, 155-57), radio (pp. 174,
176-77, 182), and traditional media. Every now and again, he seems to re-
member that the title of his book has ".com" tacked on the end, and so he
tacks on a discussion of the Internet. We might forgive this lapse if broad-
cast media and the Internet were so similar that we could map problems
and solutions from the first onto the second. However, they are such differ-
ent communications media that conceiving one in terms of the other leads
to the sorts of problems discussed in Part V above.
In another more important sense, Republic.com really is this year's
Book of the Year. The year 2001 A.D. marks the highpoint to date of
"second-generation" concerns about the antidemocratic Internet, and
Republic.com takes this fear to silly and unjustified new heights. It is per-
haps representative of a misunderstanding of the Internet and an overde-
veloped concern with its antidemocratic possibilities. This is not to say that
the other works in the second generation are all, or even mostly, wrong.
Much of this generation is absolutely correct in identifying worrying trends
about concentrations of private power, the role of technology as an unrec-
ognized regulatory force, and so on. But when these concerns revolve
around The Daily Me, group polarization, and an America-centered con-
ception of democracy and regulation, they become ludicrous.
A. Of Echo Chambers and Afterwords: Sunstein's FailedAttempt at
Reformulation
Sunstein has subsequently sought to alter the reception of his book. In
two works, a short digital monograph called Echo Chambers,257 and in the
Afterword that will appear in the paperback edition of Republic.com,258 he
modifies a number of the claims put forth in the original text. These works
deal with different features of his original claims, but both are revealing as
they appear to have been born as defenses to early criticisms of
Republic. com. 9
Echo Chambers does not fundamentally change Republic.com's the-
sis, but seeks to demonstrate that group polarization is real. Moving away
from Republic.com's theoretical and abstract discussion, Sunstein seeks to
demonstrate that two recent political events are excellent demonstrations of
256. See also Sunstein, Television, supra note 9, at 508-09.
257. CASS SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBERS (2001), at http://pup.princeton.edu/sunstein/echo.pdf (last
visited Sept. 17, 2001) (hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBERS).
258. Sunstein, Afterword, supra note 209.
259. See Sunstein, Afterword, supra note 209, at para. 1; ECHO CHAMBERS, supra note 257, at 3-4.
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group polarization at work.260 These two incidents are the battle for the
U.S. presidency in late 2000 and the impeachment hearings of President
Clinton. In each, Sunstein notes the division between perceptions of the
incidents between Republican and Democrat politicians. For example, he
gushes that an "astonishing" 98% of House Republicans voted for
impeachment, while only 2% of House Democrats voted similarly.26 After
rehearsing the basic theory discussed above,26 Sunstein concludes that
these events are "case studies in group polarization." '263 His entire evidence
for this appears to be the regularity of the outcome. He explains, "It simply
defies belief to suggest that the observed pattern of judgments is what you
would expect if each person, whether ordinary citizen or legislator, had
consulted his or her own conscience .... 264
Of all the arguments made in Republic.com, none compares to the
foolishness of this conclusion. We cannot assume, simply from a consistent
outcome, that group polarization must be working here. What of the more
obvious explanation that the Republicans might be politically motivated
towards favoring Clinton's impeachment? Or that Democrats might con-
sider, from years of indoctrination, that the Bush v. Gore ruling265 was
politically motivated by conservative Supreme Court justices? Or, even
more simply, that the political parties enforced an incredibly strong party
line on all their members, and that a huge number of the politicians felt the
opposite of the way they voted?
In making these arguments in Echo Chambers, Sunstein pre-
sents: (1) no evidence that deliberations ever took place, in the way that
studies on group polarization assume; (2) no evidence of the starting posi-
tion of any of the politicians on any of the questions; and (3) no evidence
of their actual final thinking, as opposed to the party line enforced on them.
He nevertheless suggests that these examples are a fundamental proof of
his overall view in Republic.com, and of the application of group polariza-
tion to political and legal decision making. Surely he cannot be so ill-
versed in the empirical basis of group polarization as truly to believe this?
His Afterword to Republic.com defends a number of different aspects
of the original work. Most notably he makes two related propositions: that
260. "In this essay I leave the world of thought experiments and enter that of real-world events.
My goal here is to illuminate the problem of fragmentation and the phenomenon of group polarization,
not by observing their manifestation on the Internet, but by considering their influence on two recent
puzzles that involved a wide range of social forces, including the systems of communications ......
SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBERS, supra note 257, at 3-4.
261. Id. at4.
262. See supra Part I.B.
263. SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBERS, supra note 257, at 15.
264. Id. at 6.
265. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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The Daily Me is really just a thought experiment or metaphor,2 66 and that
his main concern was "to get hold of some neglected prerequisites of
democratic self-government. 267 He suggests that his was never an attack
on the Internet, but rather a clarion call against potential social fragmenta-
tion caused by personalized media. 68
This defense is disingenuous. As discussed above,269 Republic.com is
only meaningful if its basic premises are true. Without a realistic prospect
of The Daily Me, group polarization does not happen.27° Without group
polarization, there is no social fragmentation. Without social fragmenta-
tion, there is no need for a regulatory response.2 71 With the wrong regula-
tory response, the evil cannot be averted.272 For Sunstein to suggest that
The Daily Me is just a metaphor is essentially to relegate his own book to
the filtering category of "Irrelevant Indulgences."
Sunstein may have intended only to examine some prerequisites of
democracy, and may have only added the ".com" to the title of his book to
increase sales. But this is not the impression that the book conveys. He
writes about dangerous websites, evil newsgroups, and so forth. He shows
how websites personalize and "fragment." He argues that we should intro-
duce public spaces on the Net. His work is a philippic against the Internet,
and no amount of ex post explanations serve to dispel this impression.
B. Alexander the Great, Cass the Prophet
I hope I may prove a false prophet, but I fear the catastrophe is
even now only too near.
Demosthenes, Second Philippi2 73
Once again, we can turn to Demosthenes for insight into more modem
philippics. Demosthenes continued to rail against Philip until an uneasy
peace was established between Athens and Macedonia. Demosthenes was,
in fact, one of the delegates to the conference that established the peace.
The Philippics stood as masterpieces of oratory, but they never achieved
the effect intended by Demosthenes. Athens appeased Philip and prospered
with him. Demosthenes's words came true. He was a false prophet.
Philip went on to produce a son, a man whom we now know as
Alexander the Great. Alexander followed his father's legacy and extended
266. See Sunstein, Afterword, supra note 209, at para. 18; SUNSrEIN, ECHO CHAMBERS, supra note
257, at 3-4.
267. Sunstein, Afterword, supra note 209, at para. 4.
268. Id. atparas. 8-12.
269. See supra Part II.
270. See supra Part III.
271. See supra Part IV.
272. See supra Part V.
273. DEMOSTHENES, Second Philippic, supra note 6, para. 33.
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the reach of Macedonia.274 He marched on to conquer Asia Minor. He ruled
from Macedonia in the West to India in the East. He established the great-
est empire the Earth at that time had ever seen. 75 In this sense, his role in
his age is a little like the Internet in ours.
No doubt Alexander was aware of the Philippics. But he ignored them
and conquered the world anyway. It is impossible to say that the Internet
can be said to be aware of Republic.com, but Professor Sunstein's philip-
pic, like Demosthenes's before him, will have little effect on the world-
conquering empire that he warns against. The difference is that, unlike the
original Philippics, we are unlikely to be talking about Republic.com long
after it was written.
274. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 545 (1910).
275. Id. at 546.
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